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Wahidullah Noorzai | NIDA's avatar

This is an important question because what we left behind after September 11 was not simply a war, but an entire strategic mindset.

Twenty-five years of counterterrorism demonstrated that military power can disrupt networks, remove leaders, and reshape battlefields, but it cannot by itself resolve the political, institutional, and social conditions that allow conflict to reproduce itself.

From the field, one lesson became particularly clear to me: when strategy focuses primarily on defeating the visible enemy, it can miss the environment that continuously generates new forms of resistance.

Afghanistan was one of the clearest examples. Tactical victories could coexist with strategic deterioration because the battlefield was only one part of the system. Governance, legitimacy, institutions, local incentives, regional power competition, and the population’s perception of the future all mattered.

Perhaps the most important question after 9/11, therefore, is not simply what we defeated, but what we failed to understand.

If the next twenty-five years are to be different, security policy must move beyond the cycle of threat, intervention, retaliation, and reconstruction. It must ask what conditions produce durable political order—and whether the people living inside those systems have a meaningful role in creating it.

The ultimate measure of strategy is not how long we can fight.

It is whether we eventually create conditions in which fighting is no longer necessary.

Wahidullah Noorzai — ANCOP Strategy | NIDA

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