How Gazan suffering is described influences how the conflict is interpreted—and where the blame lies. Hyperbolic and inaccurate labels fail to describe a far more complex reality.
This entire piece was essentially a debate over semantics and a complete waste of time. Gaza has been under military blockade for almost 20 years now (which is an act of war under international law) and in the past 2 years, Israeli forces have intentionally murdered tens of thousands of women and children while denying food and medicine to the entire enclave. It is hard to come up with a single phrase or word that accurately captures the depths of Israel’s crimes but I don’t think concentration camp is as far off as the author would like to believe. However, here are a few more that might apply: genocide, ethnic cleansing, slaughter, and massacre. The semantics are irrelevant. What matters here is substance and substantively, Israel is guilty of serious war crimes of the sort that have no statute of limitations. It must be held to account one day. It’s long list of crimes prove there will never be peace in the Middle East until it is wiped off the map. Instead of wasting our time with silly debates over vocabulary, we would all be better served using our energy to try and formulate a plan to deal with the existential threat posed by the baby killing sociopaths who rule Israel and their arsenal of nuclear weapons.
Words do indeed have meanings, but in his anti-Palestinian propaganda Hamza Howidy distorts the meanings and effects of concentration camps and open-air prisons to the degree where such things would barely exist throughout history in order to blame Palestine as usual and absolve the apartheid genocidal "Israel" from any responsibility whatsoever.
“Concentration camp” is not a formal legal classification in IHL the way “occupation,” “blockade,” or “siege” are. It’s a historical/political descriptor. Trying to “win” by imposing one rigid dictionary definition is a definitional fallacy (changing the debate from material conditions to word-policing). Hamza Howidy then picks a definition that smuggles in “total physical custody” and “guard inside the camp” as necessary conditions. But that is not how modern control works (remote surveillance, permit regimes, control of borders/registry/utilities).
Hamza Howidy's claim that Gaza can’t be like a concentration camp because Hamas governs internally is a false dichotomy (“either Hamas governs or Israel controls”). You can have internal administration by a local authority and external effective control over core life systems (movement, population registry, air/sea access, imports/exports, utilities, currency flows). This is exactly why many legal and humanitarian actors describe Israel as retaining effective control despite the 2005 “disengagement.” The ICRC casebook explicitly notes Israel’s border powers enabling it to “determine the conditions of life” in Gaza. Human rights and legal analyses (e.g., ECCHR) summarize the mainstream view: continued effective control via borders, airspace, territorial waters, infrastructure (water/electricity), and population registry. Gisha’s “scale of control” documentation is also widely used on this point.
Hamza Howidy also treats occupation as “boots on the ground running city hall.” But occupation in IHL turns on ‘effective control/actual authority’, which can exist without administering every municipal function, especially when an occupying power controls the territory’s entries/exits, registry, air/sea space, and crucial civilian infrastructure. (That’s precisely the argument many states, organizations, and scholars make in the Gaza context.) Also: the ICJ’s July 19, 2024 advisory opinion summary explicitly notes the Court did not take a position on whether Gaza remained occupied after 2005 in that opinion. So Hamza Howidy's confident “this stretches occupation beyond its intended bounds” is not a settled legal conclusion—it’s a partisan one.
Hamza Howidy's claim that "one cannot logically be a “camp guard” if one does not stand inside the camp" is based on anachronistic logic. Modern coercive control often operates from outside through remote control of borders, air/sea denial, permit systems and “category” eligibility, control of population registry and IDs (affecting family unification, residency, travel) and control over what goods enter/exit and in what amounts. The ICRC casebook and OCHA reporting make clear Gaza movement is governed by a restrictive permit/eligibility regime, not normal “border bureaucracy.”
Hamza Howidy's claim that the Rafah border exists and that therefore Gaza is not a concentration camp or an open-air prison is again based on a false dichotomy. The ICRC casebook also notes Israel’s control of crossings and significant influence over conditions of entry/exit. Real-world confinement can be multi-actor. Adding Egypt doesn’t dissolve confinement or absolve "Israel" of its responsibility; it just means multiple states contribute to it. moreover, Egypt controls its own border with the Gaza Strip. It does not blockade the Gaza Strip by air and sea. Only "Israel" does that, and therefore the vast majority of the blame lands on "Israel" for the Gaza Strip being an open-air prison and a concentration camp.
A permit process for tourism or edcuation does not prove freedom of movement; it can prove the opposite. If most people are ineligible by category (not by individualized risk) and movement depends on discretionary permits, that’s consistent with an enclosure/closure regime, not ordinary travel. OCHA’s descriptions are explicit about categorical exclusion.
The existence of a private sector or banks or a stock exchange to claim that the Gaza Strip is not an open-air prison or a concentration camp is a classic rhetorical trick. Markets can exist inside coercive enclosures. That’s historically true across many kinds of controlled spaces (including besieged areas, sanctioned economies, and heavily restricted territories). Having businesses doesn’t refute confinement; it onkly shows Palestinian people's resilience and trying to survive under constraints.
International law distinguishes between blockade (naval/land/air denial with IHL limits), siege, and occupation (if effective control exists), but none of these categories depends on whether the local authority has a police force or whether pristine beaches, sparkling restaurants along Al-Rasheed Street, or upscale malls of the Rimal district exist. OCHA’s “humanitarian impact of the blockade” reporting documents a long-term closure regime with severe effects on livelihoods and movement. Selecting the most photogenic streets to counter “open-air prison” is cherry-picking (equivalent to filming a nice block in a poor city to deny poverty). Inequality does not negate coercive control; it’s common in restricted environments. The legal question is whether actions comply with IHL/IHRL obligations, not whether you can find a restaurant video.
The claim that "Hamas elite" are "worth between $1 and $5 billion" is not based on "multiple investigations", but on mere baseless assertions by rightist "Israeli" media. Not a single financial statement was ever produced to prove the ludicrous accusations of billions personally owned by the so-called "Hamas elite". "Israeli" political leaders, oligarchs, arms exporters, tech executives, and real-estate magnates are millionaires and billionaires, while tens of thousands of Holocaust survivors, arguably the most morally symbolically protected group in Israeli society, have for years lived below the poverty line, relying on food assistance, charity, or inadequate stipends. "Israeli" state comptroller reports, civil society organizations, and "Israeli" media have repeatedly documented this disparity.
Critics do not claim suffering is solved by simply "opening the gates". They argue for, lifting unlawful restrictions, ensuring humanitarian access, ending collective punishment, addressing security through lawful, proportionate means and political resolution. Hamza Howidy here invents a simplistic opponent and a strawman to make his own position look “reasonable.”
A good-faith discussion would separate metaphors (“open-air prison,” “largest concentration camp”) used to descroibe realities on the ground, and legal categories (occupation, blockade, siege, collective punishment, starvation prohibition, humanitarian access duties). It would then address what reputable bodies report about control and movement such as OCHA’s documentation of restricted movement/permit regimes, ICRC descriptions of Israel’s border powers determining conditions of life, and legal summaries noting the mainstream “effective control” position.
But like all pro-"Israel" activists, Hamza Howidy was never a good-faith actor.
Words do indeed have meanings, but in his anti-Palestinian propaganda Hamza Howidy distorts the meanings and effects of concentration camps and open-air prisons to the degree where such things would barely exist throughout history in order to blame Palestine as usual and absolve the apartheid genocidal "Israel" from any responsibility whatsoever.
“Concentration camp” is not a formal legal classification in IHL the way “occupation,” “blockade,” or “siege” are. It’s a historical/political descriptor. Trying to “win” by imposing one rigid dictionary definition is a definitional fallacy (changing the debate from material conditions to word-policing). Hamza Howidy then picks a definition that smuggles in “total physical custody” and “guard inside the camp” as necessary conditions. But that is not how modern control works (remote surveillance, permit regimes, control of borders/registry/utilities).
Hamza Howidy's claim that Gaza can’t be like a concentration camp because Hamas governs internally is a false dichotomy (“either Hamas governs or Israel controls”). You can have internal administration by a local authority and external effective control over core life systems (movement, population registry, air/sea access, imports/exports, utilities, currency flows). This is exactly why many legal and humanitarian actors describe Israel as retaining effective control despite the 2005 “disengagement.” The ICRC casebook explicitly notes Israel’s border powers enabling it to “determine the conditions of life” in Gaza. Human rights and legal analyses (e.g., ECCHR) summarize the mainstream view: continued effective control via borders, airspace, territorial waters, infrastructure (water/electricity), and population registry. Gisha’s “scale of control” documentation is also widely used on this point.
Hamza Howidy also treats occupation as “boots on the ground running city hall.” But occupation in IHL turns on ‘effective control/actual authority’, which can exist without administering every municipal function, especially when an occupying power controls the territory’s entries/exits, registry, air/sea space, and crucial civilian infrastructure. (That’s precisely the argument many states, organizations, and scholars make in the Gaza context.) Also: the ICJ’s July 19, 2024 advisory opinion summary explicitly notes the Court did not take a position on whether Gaza remained occupied after 2005 in that opinion. So Hamza Howidy's confident “this stretches occupation beyond its intended bounds” is not a settled legal conclusion—it’s a partisan one.
Hamza Howidy's claim that "one cannot logically be a “camp guard” if one does not stand inside the camp" is based on anachronistic logic. Modern coercive control often operates from outside through remote control of borders, air/sea denial, permit systems and “category” eligibility, control of population registry and IDs (affecting family unification, residency, travel) and control over what goods enter/exit and in what amounts. The ICRC casebook and OCHA reporting make clear Gaza movement is governed by a restrictive permit/eligibility regime, not normal “border bureaucracy.”
Hamza Howidy's claim that the Rafah border exists and that therefore Gaza is not a concentration camp or an open-air prison is again based on a false dichotomy. The ICRC casebook also notes Israel’s control of crossings and significant influence over conditions of entry/exit. Real-world confinement can be multi-actor. Adding Egypt doesn’t dissolve confinement or absolve "Israel" of its responsibility; it just means multiple states contribute to it. moreover, Egypt controls its own border with the Gaza Strip. It does not blockade the Gaza Strip by air and sea. Only "Israel" does that, and therefore the vast majority of the blame lands on "Israel" for the Gaza Strip being an open-air prison and a concentration camp.
A permit process for tourism or edcuation does not prove freedom of movement; it can prove the opposite. If most people are ineligible by category (not by individualized risk) and movement depends on discretionary permits, that’s consistent with an enclosure/closure regime, not ordinary travel. OCHA’s descriptions are explicit about categorical exclusion.
The existence of a private sector or banks or a stock exchange to claim that the Gaza Strip is not an open-air prison or a concentration camp is a classic rhetorical trick. Markets can exist inside coercive enclosures. That’s historically true across many kinds of controlled spaces (including besieged areas, sanctioned economies, and heavily restricted territories). Having businesses doesn’t refute confinement; it onkly shows Palestinian people's resilience and trying to survive under constraints.
International law distinguishes between blockade (naval/land/air denial with IHL limits), siege, and occupation (if effective control exists), but none of these categories depends on whether the local authority has a police force or whether pristine beaches, sparkling restaurants along Al-Rasheed Street, or upscale malls of the Rimal district exist. OCHA’s “humanitarian impact of the blockade” reporting documents a long-term closure regime with severe effects on livelihoods and movement. Selecting the most photogenic streets to counter “open-air prison” is cherry-picking (equivalent to filming a nice block in a poor city to deny poverty). Inequality does not negate coercive control; it’s common in restricted environments. The legal question is whether actions comply with IHL/IHRL obligations, not whether you can find a restaurant video.
The claim that "Hamas elite" are "worth between $1 and $5 billion" is not based on "multiple investigations", but on mere baseless assertions by rightist "Israeli" media. Not a single financial statement was ever produced to prove the ludicrous accusations of billions personally owned by the so-called "Hamas elite". "Israeli" political leaders, oligarchs, arms exporters, tech executives, and real-estate magnates are millionaires and billionaires, while tens of thousands of Holocaust survivors, arguably the most morally symbolically protected group in Israeli society, have for years lived below the poverty line, relying on food assistance, charity, or inadequate stipends. "Israeli" state comptroller reports, civil society organizations, and "Israeli" media have repeatedly documented this disparity.
Critics do not claim suffering is solved by simply "opening the gates". They argue for, lifting unlawful restrictions, ensuring humanitarian access, ending collective punishment, addressing security through lawful, proportionate means and political resolution. Hamza Howidy here invents a simplistic opponent and a strawman to make his own position look “reasonable.”
A good-faith discussion would separate metaphors (“open-air prison,” “largest concentration camp”) used to descroibe realities on the ground, and legal categories (occupation, blockade, siege, collective punishment, starvation prohibition, humanitarian access duties). It would then address what reputable bodies report about control and movement such as OCHA’s documentation of restricted movement/permit regimes, ICRC descriptions of Israel’s border powers determining conditions of life, and legal summaries noting the mainstream “effective control” position.
But like all pro-"Israel" activists, Hamza Howidy was never a good-faith actor.
This entire piece was essentially a debate over semantics and a complete waste of time. Gaza has been under military blockade for almost 20 years now (which is an act of war under international law) and in the past 2 years, Israeli forces have intentionally murdered tens of thousands of women and children while denying food and medicine to the entire enclave. It is hard to come up with a single phrase or word that accurately captures the depths of Israel’s crimes but I don’t think concentration camp is as far off as the author would like to believe. However, here are a few more that might apply: genocide, ethnic cleansing, slaughter, and massacre. The semantics are irrelevant. What matters here is substance and substantively, Israel is guilty of serious war crimes of the sort that have no statute of limitations. It must be held to account one day. It’s long list of crimes prove there will never be peace in the Middle East until it is wiped off the map. Instead of wasting our time with silly debates over vocabulary, we would all be better served using our energy to try and formulate a plan to deal with the existential threat posed by the baby killing sociopaths who rule Israel and their arsenal of nuclear weapons.
Sorry, words and their meanings are important. Emotions, exaggerations, and distortions don't help us address any problem effectively.
Words do indeed have meanings, but in his anti-Palestinian propaganda Hamza Howidy distorts the meanings and effects of concentration camps and open-air prisons to the degree where such things would barely exist throughout history in order to blame Palestine as usual and absolve the apartheid genocidal "Israel" from any responsibility whatsoever.
“Concentration camp” is not a formal legal classification in IHL the way “occupation,” “blockade,” or “siege” are. It’s a historical/political descriptor. Trying to “win” by imposing one rigid dictionary definition is a definitional fallacy (changing the debate from material conditions to word-policing). Hamza Howidy then picks a definition that smuggles in “total physical custody” and “guard inside the camp” as necessary conditions. But that is not how modern control works (remote surveillance, permit regimes, control of borders/registry/utilities).
Hamza Howidy's claim that Gaza can’t be like a concentration camp because Hamas governs internally is a false dichotomy (“either Hamas governs or Israel controls”). You can have internal administration by a local authority and external effective control over core life systems (movement, population registry, air/sea access, imports/exports, utilities, currency flows). This is exactly why many legal and humanitarian actors describe Israel as retaining effective control despite the 2005 “disengagement.” The ICRC casebook explicitly notes Israel’s border powers enabling it to “determine the conditions of life” in Gaza. Human rights and legal analyses (e.g., ECCHR) summarize the mainstream view: continued effective control via borders, airspace, territorial waters, infrastructure (water/electricity), and population registry. Gisha’s “scale of control” documentation is also widely used on this point.
Hamza Howidy also treats occupation as “boots on the ground running city hall.” But occupation in IHL turns on ‘effective control/actual authority’, which can exist without administering every municipal function, especially when an occupying power controls the territory’s entries/exits, registry, air/sea space, and crucial civilian infrastructure. (That’s precisely the argument many states, organizations, and scholars make in the Gaza context.) Also: the ICJ’s July 19, 2024 advisory opinion summary explicitly notes the Court did not take a position on whether Gaza remained occupied after 2005 in that opinion. So Hamza Howidy's confident “this stretches occupation beyond its intended bounds” is not a settled legal conclusion—it’s a partisan one.
Hamza Howidy's claim that "one cannot logically be a “camp guard” if one does not stand inside the camp" is based on anachronistic logic. Modern coercive control often operates from outside through remote control of borders, air/sea denial, permit systems and “category” eligibility, control of population registry and IDs (affecting family unification, residency, travel) and control over what goods enter/exit and in what amounts. The ICRC casebook and OCHA reporting make clear Gaza movement is governed by a restrictive permit/eligibility regime, not normal “border bureaucracy.”
Hamza Howidy's claim that the Rafah border exists and that therefore Gaza is not a concentration camp or an open-air prison is again based on a false dichotomy. The ICRC casebook also notes Israel’s control of crossings and significant influence over conditions of entry/exit. Real-world confinement can be multi-actor. Adding Egypt doesn’t dissolve confinement or absolve "Israel" of its responsibility; it just means multiple states contribute to it. moreover, Egypt controls its own border with the Gaza Strip. It does not blockade the Gaza Strip by air and sea. Only "Israel" does that, and therefore the vast majority of the blame lands on "Israel" for the Gaza Strip being an open-air prison and a concentration camp.
A permit process for tourism or edcuation does not prove freedom of movement; it can prove the opposite. If most people are ineligible by category (not by individualized risk) and movement depends on discretionary permits, that’s consistent with an enclosure/closure regime, not ordinary travel. OCHA’s descriptions are explicit about categorical exclusion.
The existence of a private sector or banks or a stock exchange to claim that the Gaza Strip is not an open-air prison or a concentration camp is a classic rhetorical trick. Markets can exist inside coercive enclosures. That’s historically true across many kinds of controlled spaces (including besieged areas, sanctioned economies, and heavily restricted territories). Having businesses doesn’t refute confinement; it onkly shows Palestinian people's resilience and trying to survive under constraints.
International law distinguishes between blockade (naval/land/air denial with IHL limits), siege, and occupation (if effective control exists), but none of these categories depends on whether the local authority has a police force or whether pristine beaches, sparkling restaurants along Al-Rasheed Street, or upscale malls of the Rimal district exist. OCHA’s “humanitarian impact of the blockade” reporting documents a long-term closure regime with severe effects on livelihoods and movement. Selecting the most photogenic streets to counter “open-air prison” is cherry-picking (equivalent to filming a nice block in a poor city to deny poverty). Inequality does not negate coercive control; it’s common in restricted environments. The legal question is whether actions comply with IHL/IHRL obligations, not whether you can find a restaurant video.
The claim that "Hamas elite" are "worth between $1 and $5 billion" is not based on "multiple investigations", but on mere baseless assertions by rightist "Israeli" media. Not a single financial statement was ever produced to prove the ludicrous accusations of billions personally owned by the so-called "Hamas elite". "Israeli" political leaders, oligarchs, arms exporters, tech executives, and real-estate magnates are millionaires and billionaires, while tens of thousands of Holocaust survivors, arguably the most morally symbolically protected group in Israeli society, have for years lived below the poverty line, relying on food assistance, charity, or inadequate stipends. "Israeli" state comptroller reports, civil society organizations, and "Israeli" media have repeatedly documented this disparity.
Critics do not claim suffering is solved by simply "opening the gates". They argue for, lifting unlawful restrictions, ensuring humanitarian access, ending collective punishment, addressing security through lawful, proportionate means and political resolution. Hamza Howidy here invents a simplistic opponent and a strawman to make his own position look “reasonable.”
A good-faith discussion would separate metaphors (“open-air prison,” “largest concentration camp”) used to descroibe realities on the ground, and legal categories (occupation, blockade, siege, collective punishment, starvation prohibition, humanitarian access duties). It would then address what reputable bodies report about control and movement such as OCHA’s documentation of restricted movement/permit regimes, ICRC descriptions of Israel’s border powers determining conditions of life, and legal summaries noting the mainstream “effective control” position.
But like all pro-"Israel" activists, Hamza Howidy was never a good-faith actor.
Agreed.
Words do indeed have meanings, but in his anti-Palestinian propaganda Hamza Howidy distorts the meanings and effects of concentration camps and open-air prisons to the degree where such things would barely exist throughout history in order to blame Palestine as usual and absolve the apartheid genocidal "Israel" from any responsibility whatsoever.
“Concentration camp” is not a formal legal classification in IHL the way “occupation,” “blockade,” or “siege” are. It’s a historical/political descriptor. Trying to “win” by imposing one rigid dictionary definition is a definitional fallacy (changing the debate from material conditions to word-policing). Hamza Howidy then picks a definition that smuggles in “total physical custody” and “guard inside the camp” as necessary conditions. But that is not how modern control works (remote surveillance, permit regimes, control of borders/registry/utilities).
Hamza Howidy's claim that Gaza can’t be like a concentration camp because Hamas governs internally is a false dichotomy (“either Hamas governs or Israel controls”). You can have internal administration by a local authority and external effective control over core life systems (movement, population registry, air/sea access, imports/exports, utilities, currency flows). This is exactly why many legal and humanitarian actors describe Israel as retaining effective control despite the 2005 “disengagement.” The ICRC casebook explicitly notes Israel’s border powers enabling it to “determine the conditions of life” in Gaza. Human rights and legal analyses (e.g., ECCHR) summarize the mainstream view: continued effective control via borders, airspace, territorial waters, infrastructure (water/electricity), and population registry. Gisha’s “scale of control” documentation is also widely used on this point.
Hamza Howidy also treats occupation as “boots on the ground running city hall.” But occupation in IHL turns on ‘effective control/actual authority’, which can exist without administering every municipal function, especially when an occupying power controls the territory’s entries/exits, registry, air/sea space, and crucial civilian infrastructure. (That’s precisely the argument many states, organizations, and scholars make in the Gaza context.) Also: the ICJ’s July 19, 2024 advisory opinion summary explicitly notes the Court did not take a position on whether Gaza remained occupied after 2005 in that opinion. So Hamza Howidy's confident “this stretches occupation beyond its intended bounds” is not a settled legal conclusion—it’s a partisan one.
Hamza Howidy's claim that "one cannot logically be a “camp guard” if one does not stand inside the camp" is based on anachronistic logic. Modern coercive control often operates from outside through remote control of borders, air/sea denial, permit systems and “category” eligibility, control of population registry and IDs (affecting family unification, residency, travel) and control over what goods enter/exit and in what amounts. The ICRC casebook and OCHA reporting make clear Gaza movement is governed by a restrictive permit/eligibility regime, not normal “border bureaucracy.”
Hamza Howidy's claim that the Rafah border exists and that therefore Gaza is not a concentration camp or an open-air prison is again based on a false dichotomy. The ICRC casebook also notes Israel’s control of crossings and significant influence over conditions of entry/exit. Real-world confinement can be multi-actor. Adding Egypt doesn’t dissolve confinement or absolve "Israel" of its responsibility; it just means multiple states contribute to it. moreover, Egypt controls its own border with the Gaza Strip. It does not blockade the Gaza Strip by air and sea. Only "Israel" does that, and therefore the vast majority of the blame lands on "Israel" for the Gaza Strip being an open-air prison and a concentration camp.
A permit process for tourism or edcuation does not prove freedom of movement; it can prove the opposite. If most people are ineligible by category (not by individualized risk) and movement depends on discretionary permits, that’s consistent with an enclosure/closure regime, not ordinary travel. OCHA’s descriptions are explicit about categorical exclusion.
The existence of a private sector or banks or a stock exchange to claim that the Gaza Strip is not an open-air prison or a concentration camp is a classic rhetorical trick. Markets can exist inside coercive enclosures. That’s historically true across many kinds of controlled spaces (including besieged areas, sanctioned economies, and heavily restricted territories). Having businesses doesn’t refute confinement; it onkly shows Palestinian people's resilience and trying to survive under constraints.
International law distinguishes between blockade (naval/land/air denial with IHL limits), siege, and occupation (if effective control exists), but none of these categories depends on whether the local authority has a police force or whether pristine beaches, sparkling restaurants along Al-Rasheed Street, or upscale malls of the Rimal district exist. OCHA’s “humanitarian impact of the blockade” reporting documents a long-term closure regime with severe effects on livelihoods and movement. Selecting the most photogenic streets to counter “open-air prison” is cherry-picking (equivalent to filming a nice block in a poor city to deny poverty). Inequality does not negate coercive control; it’s common in restricted environments. The legal question is whether actions comply with IHL/IHRL obligations, not whether you can find a restaurant video.
The claim that "Hamas elite" are "worth between $1 and $5 billion" is not based on "multiple investigations", but on mere baseless assertions by rightist "Israeli" media. Not a single financial statement was ever produced to prove the ludicrous accusations of billions personally owned by the so-called "Hamas elite". "Israeli" political leaders, oligarchs, arms exporters, tech executives, and real-estate magnates are millionaires and billionaires, while tens of thousands of Holocaust survivors, arguably the most morally symbolically protected group in Israeli society, have for years lived below the poverty line, relying on food assistance, charity, or inadequate stipends. "Israeli" state comptroller reports, civil society organizations, and "Israeli" media have repeatedly documented this disparity.
Critics do not claim suffering is solved by simply "opening the gates". They argue for, lifting unlawful restrictions, ensuring humanitarian access, ending collective punishment, addressing security through lawful, proportionate means and political resolution. Hamza Howidy here invents a simplistic opponent and a strawman to make his own position look “reasonable.”
A good-faith discussion would separate metaphors (“open-air prison,” “largest concentration camp”) used to descroibe realities on the ground, and legal categories (occupation, blockade, siege, collective punishment, starvation prohibition, humanitarian access duties). It would then address what reputable bodies report about control and movement such as OCHA’s documentation of restricted movement/permit regimes, ICRC descriptions of Israel’s border powers determining conditions of life, and legal summaries noting the mainstream “effective control” position.
But like all pro-"Israel" activists, Hamza Howidy was never a good-faith actor.