The Tangsiri point lands harder than the article perhaps realises. Our analysis this morning identifies a specific 2-7 day operational discontinuity created by his elimination — not a strategic shift, but a mechanical one. The corridor pre-clearance protocols, fee billing, and bilateral flag-state authorisations that kept neutral shipping moving through Hormuz required an authoritative signatory. That signatory is now gone. Indian, Malaysian, and Chinese operators are deferring transits pending explicit successor confirmation. The selective passage regime the market has been treating as stable is more fragile than it looks, and AIS data should show that before any diplomatic signal does.
The regional coalition framing in the final section is also developing faster than consensus expects. The UAE has moved beyond diplomatic language this week into what amounts to a public ultimatum — Abu Dhabi's entire economic model depends on unimpeded strait access, and every bilateral corridor deal Iran strikes with Malaysia, China, or India demonstrates that Tehran can pick winners and losers among shipping nations. That's existential for the UAE, and they don't need Washington's permission to start assembling their own coalition of the willing.
The mosaic doctrine analysis is the strongest part of this piece. The question of institutional depth — how many Larijanis the system can lose before coherence gives way — is exactly the right frame. We'd add one variable: the distinction between the IRGC's operational resilience and the civilian Foreign Ministry's negotiating capacity. Those two tracks are diverging, not converging. The IRGC is planning for a post-deadline world. The Foreign Ministry is still bargaining. How long that gap stays manageable is the real durability question.
I don't want a war at all, but all things considered it could have gone a lot worse. Certainly, if I was the IRGC I would hate the current situation where most of their leaders are dead, and their grip on power is loosening.
Everything you say seems to indicate that you do want a war. It’s pure unevidenced fantasy to claim the Iran’s leaders are losing their grip on power, but then again I suspect your war aims are rather different to what you’ll publicly claim.
This would end their multi-decade war against the Iranian people.
Beyond that, I don't want a war, but I can see why a war has happened. The Islamic regime are threatening their neighbours, and many countries around the world.
Yes, those prosecuting wars of aggression, and their supporters, would always prefer the state they’re attacking to ‘peacefully disband’ but that’s as foolish as thinking that gol can be achieved by bombing the country. Your stated war aims are as entirely unachievable as those stated by the US.
The real aims, to destroy the country and render it similar to Libya or Syria are obviously possible. You seem to be fine with that outcome.
And publicly stating than Iran was a threat to its neighbours is surely just a humiliation you’re prepared to live with. Very similar to your Farage-esque perpetuation of Israeli propaganda paganda on the ambulance fire. I take it you haven’t rolled back on that?
I don't want Iran to be destroyed at all. I want a prosperous and successful Iran that is friendly to the rest of the world.
If we are going by the standard of just making things up, I could just as easily say you want Iran to be destroyed. And Britain. And Jewish people. Right?
The threat is not existential purely on the level of Iran’s capability. A nuclear armed Iranian, even one not imminently suggested by the CIA or Mossad to be preparing a strike, would by its very nature deeply incentivize the U.S. and Israel toward first use at the mere hint of danger, potentially drawing Russian, NK, or Chinese retaliation.
It all comes down to taking and holding Kharg
The Tangsiri point lands harder than the article perhaps realises. Our analysis this morning identifies a specific 2-7 day operational discontinuity created by his elimination — not a strategic shift, but a mechanical one. The corridor pre-clearance protocols, fee billing, and bilateral flag-state authorisations that kept neutral shipping moving through Hormuz required an authoritative signatory. That signatory is now gone. Indian, Malaysian, and Chinese operators are deferring transits pending explicit successor confirmation. The selective passage regime the market has been treating as stable is more fragile than it looks, and AIS data should show that before any diplomatic signal does.
The regional coalition framing in the final section is also developing faster than consensus expects. The UAE has moved beyond diplomatic language this week into what amounts to a public ultimatum — Abu Dhabi's entire economic model depends on unimpeded strait access, and every bilateral corridor deal Iran strikes with Malaysia, China, or India demonstrates that Tehran can pick winners and losers among shipping nations. That's existential for the UAE, and they don't need Washington's permission to start assembling their own coalition of the willing.
The mosaic doctrine analysis is the strongest part of this piece. The question of institutional depth — how many Larijanis the system can lose before coherence gives way — is exactly the right frame. We'd add one variable: the distinction between the IRGC's operational resilience and the civilian Foreign Ministry's negotiating capacity. Those two tracks are diverging, not converging. The IRGC is planning for a post-deadline world. The Foreign Ministry is still bargaining. How long that gap stays manageable is the real durability question.
— Phaseglass Global Intelligence
Is the war going the way you’d hoped John?
I don't want a war at all, but all things considered it could have gone a lot worse. Certainly, if I was the IRGC I would hate the current situation where most of their leaders are dead, and their grip on power is loosening.
Everything you say seems to indicate that you do want a war. It’s pure unevidenced fantasy to claim the Iran’s leaders are losing their grip on power, but then again I suspect your war aims are rather different to what you’ll publicly claim.
I want the Islamic regime to peacefully disband.
This would end their multi-decade war against the Iranian people.
Beyond that, I don't want a war, but I can see why a war has happened. The Islamic regime are threatening their neighbours, and many countries around the world.
Yes, those prosecuting wars of aggression, and their supporters, would always prefer the state they’re attacking to ‘peacefully disband’ but that’s as foolish as thinking that gol can be achieved by bombing the country. Your stated war aims are as entirely unachievable as those stated by the US.
The real aims, to destroy the country and render it similar to Libya or Syria are obviously possible. You seem to be fine with that outcome.
And publicly stating than Iran was a threat to its neighbours is surely just a humiliation you’re prepared to live with. Very similar to your Farage-esque perpetuation of Israeli propaganda paganda on the ambulance fire. I take it you haven’t rolled back on that?
I don't want Iran to be destroyed at all. I want a prosperous and successful Iran that is friendly to the rest of the world.
If we are going by the standard of just making things up, I could just as easily say you want Iran to be destroyed. And Britain. And Jewish people. Right?
It's going better than we could have possibly hoped for.
The threat is not existential purely on the level of Iran’s capability. A nuclear armed Iranian, even one not imminently suggested by the CIA or Mossad to be preparing a strike, would by its very nature deeply incentivize the U.S. and Israel toward first use at the mere hint of danger, potentially drawing Russian, NK, or Chinese retaliation.