Washington’s Window to Rewrite the Peace Process
Palestinian statehood recognition done right could isolate extremists, empower reformers, and open the door to wider regional peace
When the United Nations General Assembly meets in September, discussions will take place against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Gaza. But something new is unfolding: the diplomatic ground is shifting beneath Washington’s feet. France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other major Western powers are signaling their readiness to recognize a Palestinian state—some unilaterally, others under loose conditions. They are responding to the devastation in Gaza, growing international frustration with Israel’s policies, and a shared recognition that the current situation—prolonged occupation, chronic humanitarian crisis, and no political horizon—cannot be sustained.
For the United States, the coming months will require a clear policy choice. It can watch from the sidelines as allies move ahead, or it can seize the initiative and shape the terms of recognition to serve both regional stability and its own strategic interests. Washington’s role should not be to obstruct Palestinian statehood, but to structure it, anchoring recognition in a framework of genuine reform, complete Hamas disarmament, and clear regional incentives.
This approach would build on ideas first advanced in the early 2000s, when the Bush administration endorsed conditional statehood tied to measurable benchmarks. This strategy remains relevant and may offer the most credible path forward today.
In 2002, President George W. Bush became the first U.S. leader to openly back the creation of a Palestinian state “living side by side in peace and security with Israel.” His administration’s Roadmap for Peace, developed with the EU, Russia, and the UN, laid out an incremental approach: end violence, overhaul Palestinian governance, then negotiate final status. The effort collapsed amid Hamas’s rise and deepening Israeli security fears. But the core principle, phased recognition tied to performance, remains sound.
An updated version should be explicit and require:
Provisional recognition of Palestinian statehood, contingent on verifiable benchmarks;
Total disarmament and dissolution of Hamas and other armed factions, guaranteed by regional and international partners;
Institutional reform within the Palestinian Authority, including anti-corruption safeguards, judicial independence, and leadership renewal;
Mutual recognition, with Israel acknowledged as a Jewish and democratic state within secure borders;
A phased normalization plan between Israel and Arab/Muslim-majority states linked to continued Palestinian progress.
This is the time to act. In July, Paris warned it would recognize a Palestinian state by September absent a viable U.S.-led peace push. London called recognition “a necessary step toward reviving a moribund peace process.” Ottawa pledged support within a “responsible, enforceable framework” safeguarding Israel’s security. Even Portugal has set recognition in motion, banking on Palestinian commitments and Arab willingness to normalize ties with Israel.
These moves share a common thread of frustration with Israel’s war conduct and the lack of a long-term plan. Yet none of these governments have paired recognition with clear, enforceable conditions on Hamas disarmament or Palestinian Authority reform. Washington is well-positioned to define a recognition process that moves beyond symbolism and functions as a practical instrument of policy.
The timing is unusually favorable. Israel has made Hamas’s disarmament a key war objective. At the same time, the Arab League, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, issued an unprecedented joint call in July for Hamas to disarm and relinquish control of Gaza. For the first time, virtually all Arab states condemned the October 7 attack. Even Iran and its proxies, weakened by regional dynamics, are poorly positioned to mount an effective counteroffensive.
The question is no longer whether Hamas will lose its grip, but what comes next and who will define it.
A U.S.-led provisional recognition framework could revive the stalled normalization process between Israel and the Arab world. The original Abraham Accords of 2020 brought Israel into formal relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, but left Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Pakistan on the sidelines. Gaza’s war and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hardline stance froze any momentum.
Now, with Hamas marginalized and a credible Palestinian partner in play, normalization could again be politically viable. Gulf and Asian officials have privately signaled interest in reopening talks, provided the Palestinian question is addressed. Washington could use conditional recognition to provide precisely that cover.
The dividends would be more than diplomatic. A reformed, internationally recognized Palestinian state could anchor a long-envisioned economic corridor linking the Mediterranean to the Gulf. The Saudi Public Investment Fund’s $700 billion war chest, the UAE’s global finance clout, and Israel’s $50 billion tech sector could converge in projects spanning logistics, agriculture, and technology transfer, creating powerful economic disincentives for renewed conflict.
Israeli business leaders have quietly explored such ventures. But they insist on a secure, transparent Palestinian governance structure before investing—a condition a U.S.-led recognition framework could help guarantee.
For Israel, its current trajectory is unsustainable. Gaza has deepened its diplomatic isolation, eroded its European alliances, and fueled grassroots hostility worldwide. A U.S.-led framework offers an off-ramp. By embracing a credible process for Palestinian statehood, Israel could undercut boycott campaigns, reenter key markets, and rehabilitate its declining international standing.
The reputational gains would be well worth it. Israeli universities could sidestep academic boycotts; tech firms could expand into previously closed markets; and Israel could credibly claim it seeks peace with reformed, responsible Palestinian leadership.
The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) governance failures are still the elephant in the room. Corruption perceptions are widespread. Nearly 90 percent of Palestinians view the PA as corrupt, and most want President Mahmoud Abbas to resign. In April 2024, the PA announced reforms aimed at transparency and the rule of law. But history shows such pledges often fade absent external enforcement.
Donor states must insist on hard accountability:
Independent oversight with rotating international leadership;
Transparent budgets and public reporting;
Merit-based appointments;
Judicial independence;
A functioning legislature meeting regularly.
Failure to demand such reforms after the Oslo Accords helped pave Hamas’s path to electoral victory in 2006. This time, accountability must be enforced.
Critics will say recognition rewards terror after October 7. But under a conditional model, recognition is not a gift to Hamas. It is contingent upon Hamas’s complete disarmament, political dismantlement, and release of the hostages, coupled with the rise of a legitimate, reform-minded Palestinian leadership.
This framework is unambiguously designed to demonstrate that armed resistance brings no lasting benefits, while effective governance and sustained diplomacy can produce measurable outcomes. Palestinians gain a viable political alternative to Hamas’s nihilism. Israel gains security guarantees and normalization prospects. And the United States gains strategic breathing room to focus on other priorities—from Ukraine to Taiwan to economic security.
Washington has the opportunity to guide the next phase of the Israeli–Palestinian process by advancing provisional recognition linked to demilitarization, institutional reform, and regional integration, and alleviating the prolonged humanitarian suffering in Gaza. Reducing civilian hardship is essential for building the legitimacy of any future Palestinian leadership and for creating conditions in which diplomacy can succeed.
To achieve this, the United States will need to set the pace and direction of the process, rather than reacting to the initiatives of others. The path forward will be written either with U.S. leadership or without it. The choice remains Washington’s to make.
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More realistic, based on current governance in the 17+ states in the Arab League, is that the Palestinian entity will remain a corrupt, authoritarian, mismanaged authority that will be no more able to disarm armed factions in Gaza than it has been in Jenin or Nablus during the last 25 years.
With that in mind, partitioning Gaza among the different clans while Israeli security hunts down the remnants of Hamas seems like a more practical alternative.