The Trio Vying to Rule a Broken Syria
Syria’s future lies in the hands of three warlords: an ideologue, a patriarch, and a chameleon
Fourteen years after the Syrian uprising, the country remains neither fully united under a new social contract nor completely disintegrated. Instead, it sits at a precarious crossroads, fragmented into zones of control dominated by three men: Mazloum Abdi in the northeast, Hikmat al-Hijri in Suwayda, and Ahmad al-Sharaa in Damascus. Each commands loyalty, resources, and armed forces. Each claims to represent stability and autonomy for their people. And each embodies a radically different vision for Syria’s future.
Can these men—an ideologue, a patriarch, and a chameleon—be part of a negotiated framework for peace? Or will fragmentation ossify into permanent division, fueling future wars, forced displacement, authoritarian relapse, and organized crime? Most importantly, what role can the U.S. and other stakeholders play to steer these dynamics toward a sustainable outcome rather than chaos?
The Ideologue: Mazloum Abdi
Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is often celebrated in Western capitals as a reliable partner in the fight against ISIS. Under his leadership, the northeast has remained one of Syria’s most stable regions. His model of governance, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, projects a strong ideological imprint drawn from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) founder Abdullah Öcalan’s philosophy of Democratic Confederalism. Democratic Confederalism envisions a decentralized system of local self-governance. It emphasizes direct democracy, political ecology, feminism, multiculturalism, self-defense, and elements of a cooperative economy.
Strengths:
Institutional Structure: The region boasts functioning local councils, a civilian legislative body, and decentralized security apparatuses.
Inclusivity (on paper): The administration enshrines gender parity and minority representation, winning support from most Kurds, local Christian communities, and some Arab tribes.
Relative Stability: Compared to much of Syria, the northeast has maintained order and provided basic services.
Military Capacity: The SDF commands well-trained, well-equipped, and battle-hardened forces with experience in counter-ISIS operations, making Abdi a critical security actor in any national framework.
Challenges:
Arab Discontent: Many Arab communities in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Tabqa, and Hassakah accuse the SDF of marginalization and cultural imposition. Many are simply unhappy with SDF rule.
Over-Centralization: Despite rhetoric of decentralism, real power remains concentrated in SDF leadership.
Ideological Education: Curricula steeped in Öcalanist thought alienate conservative populations, especially among Arabs.
Kurdish Divisions: Non-PKK-aligned Kurds feel excluded, fueling intra-Kurdish tensions.
Broader Inclusivity Issues: Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, and Turkmen have voiced concerns over ideological bias and governance practices.
Potential Role
If grievances of Arabs and other ethnic groups are addressed and ideological rigidity eased, Commander Abdi and the SDF could anchor a federal or highly decentralized model for Syria—one with legal guarantees for minorities and gender equality that extend beyond the transitional period. Abdi could also serve as a key interlocutor for those advocating secular governance and broader social freedoms in a post-conflict Syria.
The Patriarch: Hikmat al-Hijri
Over the last few years, Hikmat al-Hijri has emerged as the spiritual leader of Syria’s Druze community, and in recent months as Suwayda’s paramount political figure. This rise was not accidental: for years before the fall of the Assad regime, al-Hijri worked diligently to erode the influence of other Druze elders, positioning himself as the community’s central authority.
Strengths:
Legitimacy: Holds the loyalty of many Druze clans, particularly after resisting Damascus’s attempts to reassert control in Suwayda.
Civil Rhetoric: Advocates for a technocratic government free of sectarian bias and calls for an end to corruption.
External Support: Reportedly benefits from Israeli backing, which compensates for the relative weakness of Druze militias and reinforces his position as a regional player.
Challenges:
Administrative Inexperience: Suwayda lacks the bureaucratic capacity to govern without significant external support.
Reliance on Old Networks: Power flows through traditional elites rather than formal institutions.
External Ties and Shadow Networks: Figures in his orbit are rumored to have links to the Captagon trade (the state-sponsored drug manufacturing and trafficking apparatus of Ba'athist Syria) and former Assad loyalists—a vulnerability that could undermine credibility.
Failure to Accommodate the Bedouin Minority: No meaningful dialogue has taken place with neighboring Bedouin communities, leading to violent confrontations and the forced displacement of most Bedouins from Suwayda.
Potential Role
With security guarantees and international backing, al-Hijri could play an important role in stabilizing Syria, particularly in the south, and help improve relations with Israel, reducing the risk of further incursions and interference. His success, however, will hinge on his ability to crack down effectively on Captagon production and trade in his region, repair the fractures he helped create within the Druze community, and transition from charismatic leader to institutional builder, while ensuring external actors provide support without reinforcing clientelism.
The Chameleon: Ahmad al-Sharaa
If Abdi is the ideologue and al-Hijri the patriarch, Ahmad al-Sharaa is the consummate pragmatist—the “chameleon” who has reinvented himself repeatedly since his jihadist days. Now presiding over Damascus after Assad’s ouster, al-Sharaa seeks international legitimacy and presents himself as a transitional figure capable of stabilizing Syria.
Strengths:
Control of the Capital: Holds sway over Damascus and core state institutions.
Military Leverage: Commands significant armed forces and maintains alliances with major Sunni tribes.
Broad Sunni Backing: Enjoys strong support among Arab Sunnis—especially youth, urban elites, and even some secular elements.
Diplomatic Openings: Engaged global powers and secured partial sanctions relief, signaling a pragmatic turn toward statesmanship.
Challenges:
Authoritarian Reflexes: Despite reformist rhetoric, decision-making remains highly centralized and opaque.
Islamist Legacy: His refusal to accept federalism—combined with only vague commitments to democracy and individual rights—raises doubts about the durability of pluralism and tolerance for secular lifestyles.
Minority Integration: Relations with Alawites and Christians remain tense, fueling fears of Sunni dominance and possible institutionalized sectarianism.
Radical Elements: His inability or unwillingness to fully neutralize jihadist factions threatens both domestic and international legitimacy.
Potential Role:
Al-Sharaa’s buy-in is essential for any settlement. With his base in the capital and control of state infrastructure, he is the linchpin for reconstruction and normalization. But his evolution from insurgent commander to national statesman is far from complete; his Islamist and sectarian Sunni tendencies are still quite pronounced, coloring the entire transitional government (TG). The TG itself is ruling as though it has electoral legitimacy, and the line between it and HTS leadership is pretty thin. Civil society activists and external leverage will be decisive in helping compensate for these deficiencies.
Shared Patterns: Old Habits, New Faces
Despite their different backgrounds and governing models, the three leaders share strikingly similar habits shaped by Syria’s authoritarian legacy and the pressures of wartime survival. These patterns, if left unchecked, risk replicating the very dynamics that fueled Syria’s descent into conflict.
Inclusion in Rhetoric, Exclusion in Practice: All promise representation but struggle to integrate minorities under their authority.
Security First: Stability and control take precedence over democratization.
Dangerous Alliances: Tactical accommodation of radicals undermines long-term governance.
Political Machinations: Each leader has a record of sidelining rivals, revealing enduring authoritarian instincts.
The Stakes
Failure to forge consensus risks hardening Syria’s de facto partitions into permanent fragmentation—a scenario ripe for forced displacement, authoritarian relapse, organized crime, and exploitation by external powers. Captagon trafficking, human smuggling, and militia politics could define the next decade.
Conversely, success—even if improbable—could yield a federal or decentralized Syria capable of gradual democratization and reconstruction. That outcome requires more than rhetoric. It requires a structured, enforceable agreement among the three leaders and their respective camps, grounded in constitutional principles and supported by international guarantees.
This phase of Syria’s transition must focus on stabilization through the establishment of structural frameworks that will lay the foundation for inclusive governance and economic recovery. Only then can debates over representation, transparency, and participation become meaningful.
The focus on these three figures reflects their current dominance: each commands a loyal base, substantial resources, and enjoys international or regional backing. Representatives of other communities should certainly be consulted and included in broader processes, but the triumvirate remains the core around which any workable power-sharing framework must be built.
That said, the equation could shift. If Syria’s tribes—especially those in the central and eastern regions—unite behind a single representative leader, that figure will need to join negotiations on an equal footing with the trio. At that point, Syria’s future might rest not in a triumvirate, but in a quartet.
The United States, France, and regional powers should concentrate on helping this triumvirate bridge divides and agree on decentralization and power-sharing—a formula that enables each to claim a political victory before their constituencies.
Policy Recommendations
Breaking the current deadlock requires a combination of pragmatic compromises and strong external incentives. The following measures can help steer these power centers toward an inclusive and enforceable settlement.
Facilitated Power-Sharing Dialogue
Establish an internationally mediated platform (with U.S. backing) to negotiate constitutional principles, security arrangements, and revenue-sharing mechanisms.Adopt a Bill of Rights Now
Guarantee individual and minority rights through a constitutional charter enforced by an independent judiciary—implemented immediately, not deferred until a final constitution.Security Sector Reform
Create a Federal Defense Council integrating SDF units, Druze militias, and central forces under proportional representation, with clear limits on central intervention.Incentivize Good Governance
Lift sanctions immediately to ease economic pressure and accelerate stabilization. At the same time, use informal channels—such as phased disbursement of aid and diplomatic leverage—to encourage inclusive governance. Prioritize joint projects between autonomous regions and the central government, financed through a dedicated international pool.Prevent Radical Drift
Condition support on dismantling extremist factions and prohibiting cross-border trafficking.Institutionalize Autonomy
Legally enshrine decentralized governance for Kurds and Druze within a federal framework to reduce secessionist pressures without eroding sovereignty.
Syria’s fate rests in the hands of three men—an ideologue, a patriarch, and a chameleon. None is a democrat. Yet, in their convergence lies the possibility of either a fragile peace or a permanent war economy. The international community cannot afford to stand aside. It must act now, not to choose winners, but to build guardrails that transform rival fiefdoms into a functioning state.
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