The Future of Iran’s Proxy Network
With Khamenei gone, Gaza and other societies devastated by the Islamic Republic’s web of militias face a rare opportunity to break from the ideology that denied them stability and prosperity.
On Saturday, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the elimination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in a joint U.S. and Israeli airstrike on his leadership compound in central Tehran.
For large segments of Iranian society and many Shiite Muslims, Khamenei embodied the Islamic Revolution that began in 1978, led to the exile of the Shah, and culminated in the return of Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979. A national referendum soon followed, formally establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yasser Arafat, the preeminent leader of the Palestinian national movement for over four decades, was among the first regional leaders to congratulate the new revolutionary leadership on its success.
From 1979 onward, Iran transformed into an Islamist state driven by revolutionary ideology and ambitions to export its model beyond its borders—not only to Shiite communities but also to Sunni groups. Central to this vision was opposition to the existence of Israel and hostility toward the United States.
To advance this agenda, the Iranian regime began backing militias in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Hezbollah was founded in Lebanon in 1982 by Shia Islamist militants, with support from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, in direct response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Emerging during the Lebanese Civil War, the group aimed to fight Israeli occupation and create a Shiite Islamic state modeled on the Iranian Revolution. During the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s, the concept of an “axis” of aligned forces gained prominence, later formalized after the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011 as the “Axis of Resistance.”
This period coincided with the Palestinian leadership’s signing of the Oslo Accords in pursuit of a two-state solution—an approach the Iranian regime strongly opposed.
In response, Tehran invested heavily in Palestinian armed factions that shared its rejectionist stance toward Israel and the United States, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas.
Iran promoted to these groups the vision of a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea,” rooted in armed confrontation. That position stood in direct contrast to the unfolding peace process, particularly the 2000 Camp David summit, which centered on establishing a two-state solution. The negotiations focused on resolving core final-status issues: borders, the future of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, security arrangements, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. While imperfect and deeply contentious on all sides, they were a last-ditch effort to move from armed struggle toward negotiated statehood.
As talks faltered and eventually failed, the region was plunged into the Second Intifada. Waves of suicide bombings carried out by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad targeted buses, cafes, and public spaces inside Israel. Each attack hardened public opinion, eroded trust, and pushed diplomatic compromise further out of reach—aligning with Tehran’s broader strategy of sustained confrontation over incremental agreement.
At present, Khamenei’s elimination does not automatically dismantle the ideological system he helped entrench. The Islamic Republic was structured around a doctrine that views confrontation as a source of legitimacy. That doctrine shaped the so-called Axis of Resistance and folded the Palestinian issue into a wider regional struggle.
For Palestinians, this moment offers an urgent opportunity for reflection. The lesson lies in the dangers of expansionist, maximalist fantasies—ideas that have repeatedly failed and risk distorting a legitimate national cause when they become consumed by rigid, absolutist ideology.
Equally important is the revolution’s framing of compromise and negotiation as weakness or betrayal. This mindset influenced factions within Palestinian politics, encouraging the rejection of incremental gains in favor of absolute demands. The cost of that approach is evident today. There is nothing noble about walking away from every negotiation, rejecting every imperfect proposal, or branding advocates of pragmatism as traitors.
Refusing incremental progress—declining to build institutions where possible, secure limited gains, and improve daily life where feasible—has not produced total victory. It has produced the reality before us: Gaza devastated, the West Bank subsumed, and Palestinian political representation weakened and divided.
No state can be built without a monopoly on force. When armed power is ceded to militias, institutional authority erodes. The pattern has played out in Iraq, in Lebanon, and in Palestine.
Once these militias adopted Iran’s ideological framework, they became deeply dependent on Tehran—financially and militarily—morphing from national actors into instruments of Iranian foreign policy.
That dependency undermined the Palestinian cause internationally and obliterated any serious efforts at state-building. Internal cohesion and institutional accountability matter more than ideological alignment with distant capitals. Without unified governance and transparent institutions, even the most powerful rhetoric cannot produce durable political outcomes.
From Hezbollah in Lebanon to Shiite militias in Iraq, from the Assad regime in Syria to the Houthis in Yemen, Tehran constructed a network designed to project power asymmetrically. These groups were not identical in origin or composition, but they shared a common function: to extend Iranian influence without triggering direct conventional war. Rockets in southern Lebanon, drones launched from Yemen, militias embedded in Iraqi politics, and weapons pipelines into Gaza were all nodes in a single architecture.
The Axis of Resistance allowed Tehran to surround Israel and challenge U.S. influence across multiple fronts, and entrench itself in vulnerable states where governance was already weak. In Iraq, militias integrated into formal politics while retaining parallel armed authority. In Lebanon, Hezbollah evolved into a state-within-a-state, holding veto power over national decision-making while maintaining its own military force. In Yemen, the Houthis’ growing missile and drone capabilities turned a local civil war into a regional crisis.
Wherever militias superseded state authority, instability followed.
Now, with Khamenei gone, the question facing the region is whether this network will hold together or begin to change. Proxy systems depend on funding, coordination, ideological cohesion, and a clear strategic center. Leadership transitions in Tehran will test that cohesion. Some actors may double down, seeking to demonstrate continuity through escalation. Others may recalibrate, prioritizing survival within their own domestic arenas.
For Palestinians, the implications are especially dire. If militias remain the dominant vehicle of political expression, the cycle of dependency and decay will continue. But if this moment initiates a long-needed reassessment—if armed alignment with external powers gives way to internal political reconstruction—there may yet be space for a different trajectory.
The future of Iran’s proxy network will shape the political futures of Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Sanaa, and Gaza. The architecture Khamenei helped construct won’t disappear overnight. But it is now entering its most uncertain phase since its inception.
States now have a real window and valid reason to reclaim the monopoly over force. We’re already seeing a shift in Lebanon, where the prime minister has just announced a ban on Hezbollah’s military activities.
Khamenei built a system that thrived on managed chaos and calibrated escalation. His absence creates a vacuum across the web of actors that depended on his strategic direction.
The coming months will test whether regional leaders are prepared to move beyond proxy warfare and ideological maximalism—and finally break a cycle that has denied generations the chance at stability, dignity, and shared prosperity.
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