The Case for U.S. Reengagement with Syria

Washington’s instinct for caution may feel safe, but it’s strategically self-defeating. Continued isolation will suffocate recovery and push the country back toward despair and extremism.

In early November 2025, the United States took a dramatic and unprecedented turn in its policy toward Syria. For the first time since the country’s independence, a Syrian head of state, President Ahmed al-Sharaa, walked through the doors of the White House. His meeting with President Donald Trump, coupled with the administration’s support for a full repeal of sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act—passed in 2019 to impose sweeping economic penalties on Syria’s government and its foreign backers for wartime atrocities—signaled a new phase in U.S.–Syria relations.

It also reignited fierce debate in Washington, where lawmakers such as Representative Brian Mast remain staunchly opposed to lifting or easing sanctions, despite Mast’s late-night meeting with al-Sharaa and the notably positive impression that encounter appears to have left on him.

Their caution is understandable. But it is precisely this cautious stance that now threatens to undermine U.S. strategic interests, regional stability, and the long-term welfare of ordinary Syrians.

Supporters of keeping the Caesar Act intact argue that maintaining pressure or enabling rapid “snap-back” measures preserve U.S. leverage over a tenuous government and prevent backsliding. But this logic no longer aligns with conditions on the ground. If the goal is to influence Syria’s future, isolating its economy is the least effective strategy available.

Sanctions designed to punish governments often end up crippling the societies beneath them. Under the defunct Assad regime, Western policymakers essentially faced two options: mount a military intervention—something no government was willing to lead—or isolate a hostile regime through strict sanctions.

Those conditions have changed. The Assad regime has collapsed. A new, far more complex government, one actively seeking engagement with the international community, is now struggling to cultivate stability. This shift requires a fundamental reassessment of the logic behind continued U.S. sanctions.

The economic reality is straightforward. Strict political preconditions for sanctions relief will scare away nearly all serious investors. Those willing to engage will opt for short-term, low-risk ventures incapable of transforming the Syrian economy. Without sustained foreign investment, reconstruction is impossible; without reconstruction, economic recovery is unattainable. And when the economy remains frozen, the burden falls not on the government, but on millions of Syrians trying to rebuild their lives.

A starved economy also weakens the very actors within the transitional government—including President al-Sharaa—who are working to contain extremist groups and steer the country toward pragmatism. Across global case studies from Southeast Asia to North Africa, economic integration is among the most effective tools for reducing radicalization. Jobs, stability, and visible improvements in daily life choke off extremist narratives far more effectively than punitive isolation. Even hardened militants often turn toward worldly pursuits when conditions improve.

Conversely, when hope collapses, radicals become more interested in the raw pursuit of power. Syria is no exception. The tragic violence in the coastal mountains in March and the more recent unrest in Suweida Province show how quickly local tensions can escalate, eroding state authority and its ability to keep the peace—especially when extremist factions remain embedded within security structures. Continued sanctions would only deepen this vulnerability, undermining the government’s ability to contain radical actors and increasing the risk of renewed fragmentation and a descent back into civil war.

Sanctions would also accelerate Syria’s drift into the arms of Russia and China, despite the transitional government’s unprecedented desire to pivot toward the West. When Western doors close, Damascus has no choice but to look elsewhere for survival.

For the first time since 1946, Syria is signaling a willingness to align itself with the West. By joining the international alliance against the Islamic State and allowing the United States to open a base near Damascus, it has made its intentions unmistakably clear. Failure to completely lift the sanctions would prove a poor response and would squander a historic—and possibly fleeting—opportunity.

Skeptics point to the uncomfortable fact that Syria’s new leadership is composed of Islamists and former jihadist figures. Yet this demographic reality, ironically, grants these leaders political space that did not exist during the Assad era. The Sunni majority, after years of massacres and ethnic cleansing by Assad loyalists, Hezbollah, and Iran-backed militias, now views these former jihadist factions, ideology notwithstanding, as their protectors. They may not embrace the ideology, but they welcome the empowerment and safety these groups now provide for them.

This broad grassroots legitimacy gives the current leadership room to maneuver without feeling threatened by every criticism or concession. It has enabled pragmatic shifts, including the pursuit of U.S. engagement and alignment with Western security frameworks.

The transformation of former jihadists into rational policymakers is rare. It is also precisely the type of unlikely transition that history periodically forces the international community to shepherd rather than reject.

Lifting sanctions, reopening the U.S. embassy, encouraging American companies to participate in reconstruction, and maintaining constant diplomatic engagement—these are the tools that can meaningfully influence Syria’s future. These tools were impossible under Assad, who categorically rejected openness. They are possible now, and refusing them means abandoning the very leverage the United States has sought for decades.

This does not mean granting Damascus a blank check. Engagement must be tied to measurable reforms: rule of law, minority protections, anti-corruption measures, and the gradual containment of radical elements, including foreign militias. But these benchmarks should guide engagement rather than block it, and certainly should not take the form of snap-back triggers that would scare off investors and render sanctions relief largely symbolic.

Ultimately, the Trump Administration appears to understand the implications of this moment and has made the logical decision to lift all sanctions, backing the complete repeal of the Caesar Act. The Senate, by removing snap-back provisions from its bill, has also done its part. It is now time for the House to do the same—time for leaders like Representative Brian Mast, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to withdraw their objections and allow the bill to move forward. Weaning Syria off its long-standing “axis of resistance” posture has always enjoyed bipartisan appeal. Today, it is finally achievable. Repealing the Caesar Act is a critical step in bringing Syria into the Western fold—and keeping it there.

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