The Arab States Under Iranian Occupation Do Need a Savior

Following Israel’s strike on Iranian targets, many in the Arab world welcomed what their own governments have failed to deliver: resistance to Tehran’s dominance

Something strange happened in the first 24 hours after Israel struck Iranian targets: people across the Arab world started quietly celebrating. Not in Tel Aviv or Washington—but in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Sana’a. Many welcomed the move, not as an endorsement of Israel, but as a rare instance of meaningful pressure on the Iranian regime. In private conversations, across fragmented communities, a sentiment emerged: finally, someone is challenging Tehran’s unchecked influence.

This reaction is about more than shifting allegiances. It reflects years of frustration in Arab countries where Iranian-backed militias and political networks have undermined sovereignty and eroded national institutions. Iran’s regional strategy, conducted through armed proxies and ideological patronage, has effectively turned several Arab capitals into outposts of its foreign policy. Iranian influence is material and deeply entrenched. In Lebanon, Hezbollah holds a veto over national politics. In Yemen, the Houthis depend on Iranian weapons and direction. In Syria, Iranian-backed forces have filled the vacuum left by a collapsing regime. And in Iraq, Iran’s hand is visible in everything from military command structures to parliamentary alliances.

Tehran has achieved this without direct annexation or formal occupation. It relies instead on a network of non-state actors—armed, funded, and trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—to enforce its interests. This has created an environment in which local governments are constrained, populations are surveilled or silenced, and long-term recovery is stalled. The result is not partnership; it is dependency and coercion.

Dissidents and opposition groups continue to challenge the regime from within the country and from exile. But for those living under Iranian-backed governance in the Arab world, the prospect of an internal revolution in Tehran seems increasingly remote. The gap between rhetoric and results is growing, and the consequences are borne by populations with little agency over the forces shaping their daily lives.

The people who live in the majority Arab states caught in this web do not have time to wait for exiled activists to organize. The costs are immediate: assassinations of journalists and activists in Iraq, economic collapse in Lebanon, a protracted civil war in Yemen, and the entrenchment of sectarian militias in Syria.

The case of Iraq illustrates how deeply this dynamic has taken root. The recent partial evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, prompted by threats from Iranian-aligned militias, is only the latest symptom of a long-standing problem. Iraq’s political order is fragmented. Power is not held by a unified state, but distributed among competing factions, many of them backed by Tehran.

Iraq’s Arab population is split along Sunni and Shi’a lines, but those labels do not fully capture the political fault lines. Some Sunnis reject the post-2003 Iraqi state altogether and align ideologically with groups like ISIS. Others remain invested in the idea of a sovereign Iraq. Among Shi’a leaders, one faction supports Iranian alignment, while another resists it, seeking a state independent of Tehran’s influence.

Iran-aligned militias such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah have established a parallel state. They operate independently of the central government, exercise territorial control, and maintain their own sources of funding. In many parts of Iraq, these groups function as the de facto authority.

Western observers often ask why Iraq’s government doesn’t simply disband the militias. The answer is straightforward: the militias are embedded within the state itself. Some are formally integrated into Iraq’s security forces. Others control ministries or public infrastructure. Baghdad cannot act decisively against them without destabilizing what little authority it still has.

This is the context in which American diplomatic assets now operate: a capital city where sovereignty is negotiated daily with non-state actors who answer to Tehran.

Across the region, the Iranian regime presents itself as a bulwark against foreign intervention and Western domination. But its actions tell a different story. It has imposed its will through coercion and militarization, exporting instability in the name of ideological solidarity. What Iran offers is not anti-colonial liberation but a new form of regional domination.

For populations governed by Iranian proxies, the binary of East versus West no longer applies. What matters is whether any actor—foreign or domestic—can reverse the political stagnation and reassert local control. This is the context in which some have begun to see value in Israeli military action against Iranian assets. Not as a political endorsement, but as a tactical reprieve from years of neglect.

This calculation is born of necessity, not ideological allegiance. It is driven by a recognition that waiting for ideal conditions, or for exiled opposition groups to develop effective strategies, may no longer be viable. The Iranian regime is not static. It is active, expansive, and increasingly emboldened.

The Iranian regime has built an informal empire. It does not require territory in the traditional sense. It operates through pliant factions, ideological alignment, and the threat or use of force. It leverages religion to justify political subordination, and it exports crisis to maintain leverage in negotiations with the West.

This is not a sustainable order. It is a system that benefits a small circle of elites in Tehran and their proxies abroad, while imposing tremendous costs on the populations they claim to represent. It undermines democratic movements, distorts national economies, and leaves Arab societies in a state of arrested development.

If the Iranian opposition has a viable strategy to challenge this regime, the time to implement it is now. If not, then it must acknowledge that other actors may take the initiative, however imperfect their motives or methods may be.

What is clear is that millions of people across the region are no longer willing to wait for gradual reform. They want accountability. They want the ability to determine their own futures. And they are increasingly open to unconventional paths toward achieving that goal.

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