Is Inclusive Governance Still Possible in Post-Assad Syria?

With federalism back on the table and territorial control up for grabs, Syria’s transition is at a crucial phase. What happens next could either unite the country—or splinter it beyond repair.

One year after the dramatic collapse of the Assad regime, Syria finds itself at a consequential moment for the country’s future. The authoritarian structure that dominated for half a century is gone, but the foundations of a new order remain contested. Nowhere is this contest clearer than in the renewed disputes over federalism and the shape of territorial authority.

For many years, I believed that a federal system could provide Syria with an inclusive and stable political structure capable of managing its diversity without succumbing to the specter of partition. My preferred model was a district-based federalism: not tribal enclaves carved along crude demographic lines, but administrative districts in which naturally occurring clusters of Kurds, Druze, Ismailis, Bedouins, Christians, Alawites, and Sunni majorities could govern their own affairs. Such a system would give communities a voice without entrenching quotas or further dividing already fragmented communities.

But the federalism I envisioned is not the federalism others are now pursuing—least of all the model championed by the Kurdish movement in the northeast under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Their project has expanded steadily beyond areas with substantial Kurdish populations to encompass vast territories that are historically Arab, where SDF rule increasingly resembles a military occupation. Worse, the SDF’s embrace of federalism appears instrumental rather than principled—a mechanism for consolidating power and keeping open the option of statehood. This approach places the rest of Syria on permanent probation, compelling other local authorities and the central government to continually prove their fitness in order to avoid the threat of partition. Such conditional unity does not beget trust.

The complications deepen when we consider the ideological architecture of SDF governance. Its claim to democratic rule does not withstand scrutiny. In practice, the system imposed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, otherwise known as the PKK-aligned leadership, mirrors the authoritarianism of the Ba’athist era. The SDF may be secular, but it is not democratic. School textbooks simply praise a different eternal leader—Abdullah Öcalan instead of Hafez al-Assad—but the devotion to charismatic leadership, ideological indoctrination, and political conformity is unmistakable. Independent media does not exist. Other Kurdish parties are suppressed. Civil society activists are harassed or detained. Arabs and Christians operate as second-tier participants. In essence, SDF governance reproduces most of the odious features of the defunct Assad regime, rebranded.

Given that Washington is both the SDF’s principal ally and a key external actor shaping the Transitional Government’s trajectory, U.S. diplomats will need to remain closely engaged in ongoing negotiations over integrating SDF-held territories. Their role is not to dictate outcomes, but to help steer the process toward arrangements that reinforce stability, prevent division, and align with the broader regional transformations now underway.

Meanwhile, the Druze leadership under Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri has abandoned even the pretense of federalism, instead calling outright for a Druze state—using the biblical Hebrew name “Jabal al-Bashan“ to evoke historical significance and demand self-determination. The contours of this project are already visible: a personal fiefdom dominated by al-Hijri and his armed loyalists, many of whom once served as officers in Assad’s army and are wanted in Damascus for war crimes.

Most of their money comes from producing and smuggling Captagon, an illegal amphetamine pill that has become one of the Middle East’s biggest drug trades. Aid—whether sent by Damascus or Tel Aviv—continues to be siphoned off. Dissenters are crushed. Just recently, two former clerics who advocated rapprochement with Damascus were seized, tortured, and killed by militias loyal to al-Hijri. The siege on Suweida is enforced as much by al-Hijri’s own forces as by any measures from the Transitional Government.

Al-Hijri and his circle seem to expect Israel and the Druze community there to bankroll their experiment—an expectation as unrealistic as it is destabilizing. This is warlordism draped in national colors, coupled with a thinly veiled attempt to reproduce the Assad governance model, complete with hereditary succession to al-Hijri’s son.

Still, many Druze have rallied around al-Hijri, overlooking his abuses out of fear of renewed sectarian clashes like those of last August. Here, too, American diplomats have their work cut out for them. They must dissuade Israel from fueling al-Hijri’s separatist ambitions; make clear to al-Hijri that he must significantly moderate his rhetoric and pursue a settlement with the Transitional Government that preserves Syria’s territorial integrity—or else face sanctions and deeper isolation; and remain actively engaged in negotiations between Suwayda and Damascus to ensure that legitimate local security concerns are addressed without further dividing the Syrian people.

Some Alawites have recently joined the chorus calling for federalism, decentralization, or even a coastal enclave of their own. Their calls intensified after a day of ethnic violence in Homs, when Alawite homes in a mixed neighborhood were attacked by members of the Banu Khalid tribe, enraged by the murder of an elderly couple—apparently by gangs linked to the Assad regime or by actors seeking to provoke sectarian strife.

This time, however, security forces rushed to protect Alawite neighborhoods, and the following day, they protected both Alawite and Sunni demonstrators protesting across Homs, Latakia, Tartous, and other central and coastal towns. Only one violent incident was reported during the protests. The Transitional Government appears to have learned from past mistakes, and its responsiveness is having a clear moderating effect on the Alawite community.

The fantasy of an Alawite enclave collapses under scrutiny. Every region Alawites inhabit—whether in the plains of central Syria, the coastal mountains, or the urban coastline—is deeply mixed. The maps circulating on social media are fantasies produced by the ignorant or the malicious. Short of massive ethnic cleansing carried out by imaginary international forces, these enclaves cannot materialize. And even if they did, they would quickly become sanctuaries for remnants of the Assad dynasty and platforms for Iran’s return.

It is therefore a positive development that most Alawites, encouraged by the government’s outreach, joined the nationwide celebrations marking the first anniversary of the regime’s fall and are expressing a willingness to work with the new authorities to address their legitimate concerns.

Federal solutions rooted in sectarian enclaves face near-universal opposition. Turkey will never tolerate meaningful Kurdish autonomy on its borders and is prepared to intervene militarily. Arab states and the broader region will reject Druze or Alawite states—both of which would invite Iranian opportunism. The United States and Europe will support policies that prioritize stability: ending mass migration flows, suppressing the Captagon trade, and reactivating long-delayed infrastructure projects such as the Qatar–Turkey pipeline and the India–Gulf–Europe corridor.

And let us not forget that, until the dramatic events of late 2024 that precipitated Assad’s collapse, the world was preparing to normalize relations with the regime despite sanctions and decades of crimes. The appetite for risk remains extremely low. The Islamist credentials of the current leadership in Damascus are no longer the red flag they once were; in the shadow of Assad’s fall, pragmatism matters more than labels.

A year after its liberation from the deadly grip of the Assad dynasty, Syria must choose between two options. The first is a federal patchwork of armed mini-states with medieval mentalities locked in perpetual conflict over borders, resources, and identity. Such a landscape would produce endless waves of refugees and turn Syria into a permanent engine of regional instability.

The second is far more promising: a stable, unified Syria under a government that is far from ideal but capable of learning from its mistakes, engaging regional partners, and aligning with global economic and security frameworks.

Almost every major power—including Russia and China—has already signaled support for this second trajectory. At the same time, Israel remains undecided, and Iran, predictably, seeks the chaos of the first in hopes of regaining influence.

Yet the second scenario leaves many Syrians uneasy. They fear that the only transformation achieved after years of struggle is a shift from a minority-based authoritarian system to a majority-based one. But this shift is far more consequential than it appears.

For the first time in decades, Syria has a government that embraces free-market economics, signals openness to foreign investment, joins the international coalition against ISIS, and aligns itself politically with the Western camp. This is no small feat.

Under Assad, Syria’s only geopolitical value was as a spoiler. His Arab nationalist rhetoric concealed a sectarian regime increasingly dependent on Iran and incapable of integrating into Arab-led regional projects. Today, even modest alignment with Arab and Western interests represents a dramatic break from that destructive past. The dividends of this realignment will not only facilitate reconstruction but will also open political space for grassroots initiatives seeking to entrench democratic values and defend minority communities.

The fears of Syria’s minority communities are real and must not be dismissed. But they cannot be addressed through fantasies of homogeneous ethnic enclaves, separatist states, or artificially engineered demographics. Their representatives—inside and outside Syria—must recognize the limits imposed by internal dynamics and geopolitical realities and consider more realistic alternatives.

Maximalist demands ultimately infantilize those who make them in the eyes of international policymakers. The Transitional Government, by contrast, increasingly appears to be the only adult actor in the Syrian political landscape precisely because it speaks the language international actors understand: stability, economic revival, and deradicalization through development.

Democracy remains the goal, but it must be a democracy tailored to Syria’s internal and geopolitical conditions—one that respects diversity without fragmenting the state and acknowledges regional power dynamics without surrendering sovereignty. Minority rights must be protected, but in ways that reinforce national unity rather than undermine it or pave the way toward new cycles of violence.

Federalism may still have a place, but only the kind rooted in administrative decentralization, not ethnic or sectarian partition. The challenge ahead is to design a system that offers all communities dignity, security, and meaningful participation—without inviting chaos.

Syria deserves no less. Its people have paid far too high a price already.

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