Hamas is Not Preparing to Disarm. Its Next War Will Be Against Gazans.

The next phase of Gaza’s conflict won’t be with Israel. It will be fought in the streets of Gaza, as Hamas turns its weapons inward.

Hamas is not preparing for peace. It is preparing to wage war on the citizens of Gaza. While the Trump peace plan calls for disarmament and reconstruction, the group’s actions tell a different story. Instead of dismantling its military infrastructure, Hamas is mobilizing forces, targeting rival militias, and tightening its control over civilians. What lies ahead is not reconciliation with Israel or the Palestinian Authority, but an internal war for dominance inside Gaza itself.

Before the war, Hamas members often repeated a saying whenever reconciliation talks with the Palestinian Authority (PA) surfaced: “Gaza is three days—a day for Fatah (the PA), a day for Hamas, and doomsday.”

Despite signing Trump’s peace plan, Hamas’s behavior shows it has a different agenda from the plan’s 20 points. A Hamas Interior Ministry officer told Mondoweiss after the ceasefire that the group is preparing “the largest security campaign yet” against anti-Hamas militias operating beyond the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip. This comes alongside statements from Hamas leaders rejecting disarmament, and a report from the Israeli public broadcaster KAN three days after the ceasefire that Hamas is planning to secretly secure seats in the future leadership of the enclave.

Nine days after signing the Trump peace plan, terrorists attacked Israeli troops in Rafah, killing Major Yaniv Kula and Staff Sergeant Itay Ya’avetz. Israel responded by striking “dozens of Hamas terror targets.” The attacks resulted in the deaths of more than 100 Gazans, including dozens of women and children. The Associated Press reported that Israel halted aid deliveries to Gaza following the attacks but later resumed them. The incident, along with Hamas’s recent public executions of Gaza residents, exposed the fragility of the current ceasefire.

Under Trump’s 20-point peace plan, the United States would work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to deploy in Gaza. The ISF would train and support vetted Palestinian police forces and consult with Jordan and Egypt to create a long-term internal security solution. Together, the ISF and Palestinian forces would secure border areas to prevent weapons smuggling and facilitate the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild Gaza.

As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would gradually withdraw, following agreed-upon standards and milestones tied to demilitarization. The goal is a secure Gaza that no longer threatens Israel, Egypt, or their citizens. Practically, the IDF would hand over occupied areas to the ISF under an agreement with the transitional authority, maintaining only a security perimeter until Gaza is free of resurgent terror threats. According to the plan, if Hamas rejects or delays implementation, these provisions would proceed in the Hamas-free areas transferred from the IDF to the ISF.

The New York Times reported: “Diplomats and other officials from several countries who are familiar with the situation say there has been little progress on when the force might be assembled because of confusion over the force’s mission, which appears to be the most serious stumbling block.”

The primary concern among these countries is that if Hamas refuses to disarm, the ISF should not be expected to do Israel’s work by fighting Hamas directly. Within Hamas, the consensus remains unchanged—governance can be negotiated, but maintaining their weaponry cannot.

Since the ceasefire began, Hamas militants have spread across areas inside the Yellow Line in eastern Gaza, which encompasses 58 percent of the enclave and nearly two million residents. Meanwhile, the IDF and Israeli-backed militias remain beyond that line, creating “bubble zones” in the remaining 42 percent designated as Hamas-free areas where humanitarian aid is supposed to flow without restrictions. The result is a divided Gaza: Hamas-controlled zones and Hamas-free zones secured by the IDF and allied militias.

Jared Kushner stated, “No reconstruction funds will be going into areas that Hamas still controls.” He described plans for a “new Gaza,” built and secured by an international force to provide Palestinians “a place to go, a place to get jobs, a place to live.” These projects will be reviewed by President Trump and the “Board of Peace” before implementation.

The UAE’s Foreign Ministry previously said it could join a multinational peacekeeping force in Gaza after the war, but only at the invitation of “a reformed PA.” The Palestinian Authority, however, has shown no intention of extending such an invitation, leaving the space open to anti-Hamas militias—many of whom claim to receive assistance from the PA. Several militia members are reportedly still on the PA’s payroll, a holdover from before the 2007 split.

An officer in Hamas’s Interior Ministry told Mondoweiss: “Direct funding is carried out through those countries, as well as through entities within the Palestinian Authority, all under the supervision of the occupation’s army.” The only official PA response came from security spokesman Anwar Rjoub, who said: “As an official institution, we have no relationship with the group (the so-called Popular Forces) led by Yasser Abu Shabab.”

The militia question exposes the PA’s weakness. Palestinian security sources confirm that many anti-Hamas militia fighters still receive PA salaries—remnants of the pre-2007 security forces now operating under Israeli command. Rjoub’s denial rings hollow when salary records suggest otherwise.

According to a January 2025 poll by the Institute for Social and Economic Progress (ISEP), only 6 percent of Gazans want Hamas to continue ruling post-war, while just 5.3 percent would vote for the group in future elections. A decisive 70 percent said Hamas lacks the ability to govern. A separate Washington Institute poll found that 70 percent of Gazans support the PA sending “officials and security officers to Gaza to take over the administration there, with Hamas giving up separate armed units,” including 47 percent who strongly agreed.

This overwhelming rejection of Hamas inside Gaza may lead to new clashes between the population and the group. Disarmament, for Hamas, would mean facing the fury of a population that has already turned against it, along with revenge from victims’ families, trials, or worse.

The group’s consensus is clear that it will not voluntarily disarm. Hamas is seeking to secure secret seats in Gaza’s future leadership while maintaining control of large parts of the Strip through force and political maneuvering. It is preparing a major campaign against militias gaining power and support from Israel and other countries. Hamas has already demonstrated its willingness to use violence against Palestinian families, including recent attacks on the Doghmush and Almajaydah families.

Now, Hamas’s Interior Ministry has confirmed preparations for what it calls “the largest security campaign yet” against anti-Hamas militias operating beyond the Yellow Line — a clear sign that Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence has already begun. With no intention from the ISF or Arab forces to forcibly disarm Hamas, the group is positioned to retain its weapons indefinitely.

Trump’s 20-point plan, reinforced by Kushner’s statement that “no reconstruction funds will go to areas Hamas still controls,” creates an economic divide between Hamas-controlled and Hamas-free zones. The plan envisions a “new Gaza” rebuilt and secured by the IDF and allied forces, while Hamas-held areas remain isolated and impoverished. The result will be two Gazas: one rebuilding under international supervision, and one trapped under Hamas’s rule.

The PA’s response remains contradictory and weak. Officials deny ties to militias while continuing to pay their salaries, refuse to invite Arab peacekeeping forces, and offer no alternative political vision.

Hamas understands these dynamics and has made its choice. Maintaining armed control outweighs all other considerations: reconstruction funds, international legitimacy, or the welfare of Gaza’s people. By clinging to weapons, attacking families, and suppressing opposition, Hamas shows it would rather rule a ruined, divided Gaza by force than risk losing power through disarmament. The group is, in its own words, living by its old saying: either the day is for Hamas, or it is doomsday.

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