From Nation-Building to Order-Building
Through the lens of Iraq’s 2003 invasion, Mohammed Soliman argues that the region once called the Middle East has entered a new era defined less by nation-building and more by the search for order.
There is something disorienting about reading a book that treats your birth country as a central variable in a regional order. In West Asia: A New American Grand Strategy in the Middle East, Mohammed Soliman describes the 2003 invasion of Iraq as his “intellectual touchstone and centerpiece.” He argues that Iraq sits at the core of his analysis of the Middle East rather than at its margins, as many foreign policy makers treat it today.
I approach his argument as someone whose political consciousness was shaped by that year in Iraq.
Soliman contends that the regional system Washington describes as the “Middle East” effectively ended with the fall of Baghdad. He labels the invasion “illegal, illegitimate, and self-defeating,” a judgment that continues to divide policymakers today. The larger structural consequences, however, are more widely acknowledged. Removing Iraq from the regional balance altered the distribution of power and created new openings for Iran and Turkey to project influence across borders. The aftershocks extended well beyond regime change, realigning and recalibrating rivalries throughout the region.
This diagnosis anchors the book. The upheavals of the past two decades, in Soliman’s account, cannot be explained solely through terrorism, sectarian division, or governance failures. Those dynamics intensified after a deeper, more fundamental crack in the regional equilibrium. Washington invested heavily in democratization and counterterrorism while paying insufficient attention to what he calls the “architecture of order.” Domestic political changes couldn’t make up for the absence of a stable balance among states.
Soliman was raised in Cairo, and the 2011 uprising informed his political consciousness. He experienced both the optimism of mass mobilization and the violence and retrenchment that followed. His experiences gradually shifted his thinking. He moved away from an early focus on dignity and political participation toward a more cautious analysis centered on power, timing, and practical limits.
This shift led to what he calls a move “from nation-building to order-building.” Instead of trying to transform societies from within, his framework emphasizes stabilizing the regional environment in which those societies operate. Iraq and Syria showed how democratization efforts pursued without regard for regional power dynamics can lead to instability and prolonged conflict. The removal of Saddam Hussein altered not only Iraq’s internal politics but also the broader balance of power that structured relations among states in the region.
Soliman also questions the vocabulary used to describe the region. The term “Middle East,” he argues, reflects a European maritime perspective rooted in an earlier era of imperial dominance. Contemporary patterns of trade, capital, and energy suggest a different geographic logic. He proposes “West Asia” as a more accurate frame, spanning the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean, linking Europe to South Asia. This approach seeks to align analysis with material realities already visible on the ground.
Those realities are especially evident in the Gulf. States once treated as peripheral actors have become central nodes in an integrated economic and political system. Qatar leverages its energy resources and diplomatic reach to position itself as a mediator and connector. The United Arab Emirates directs sovereign wealth toward ports, logistics corridors, artificial intelligence, and renewable infrastructure that tie it to India, East Africa, and Europe. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 aims to reposition the kingdom as a diversified commercial and technological hub. These initiatives show a sustained effort to reposition these states economically and politically, not simply improve their public image.
Energy shipments from Qatari LNG facilities supply global markets. Emirati and Saudi capital finance infrastructure across Asia and Africa. Shipping routes and digital cables reinforce connections between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The regional map Soliman outlines corresponds to infrastructure and financial flows already in motion.
For Iraq, the implications are direct. Baghdad once imagined itself as a central axis of Arab politics. Over the past two decades, economic initiative and geopolitical gravity have gradually inched southward and eastward. Soliman interprets this as the outcome of systemic change triggered by 2003.
His assessment of American power avoids declinist rhetoric. The United States, he argues, is adjusting its role as conditions in the region change. Drawing on Churchill’s observation that “The Empires of the future are the Empires of the mind,” he suggests that influence will rely less on military presence and more on strong partnerships, technological advantages, and targeted engagement. In this view, power should be used carefully and directed toward clear, achievable goals, with attention to timing and shared responsibilities among allies.
In the latter chapters, Soliman outlines “geostrategic, security, and techno-economic coalitions” designed to anchor a more stable regional framework. These layered partnerships aim to manage competition while reducing the likelihood of open conflict. The objective is to construct an equilibrium suited to contemporary distributions of power and economic interdependence.
A tension nevertheless runs through the analysis. Iraq’s experience after 2003 showed the risks that arise when state institutions weaken, and competing actors pursue their interests without clear limits. At the same time, stability pursued without reform can entrench political systems and silence legitimate public demands. Iraq before 2003 operated within a strict balance that ultimately proved unsustainable. Whether a system focused mainly on balance-of-power politics can also accommodate demands for dignity and political participation remains an open question.
The stakes extend across the region. Iran continues to push the boundaries of regional influence, while Turkey pursues a more independent role in several neighboring arenas. Gulf states are deepening their economic ties with Asian markets, and China is steadily expanding its economic and technological presence. At the same time, the Red Sea has reemerged as a contested corridor, India’s influence is growing, and the Suez Canal remains a central artery of global commerce. In this environment, analysis based on outdated geographic assumptions risks serious misalignment.
West Asia advances a structural argument rather than a detailed policy prescription. If the regional order before 2003 has given way to a new one, the challenge now is to build a balance capable of enduring shifting power centers and deeper economic connections. Stability will depend not only on deterrence but also on legitimacy and resilient institutions.
For those of us whose political awareness was deeply influenced by the events of 2003, these questions feel especially urgent. They show how difficult it is to rebuild a regional balance once it has been disrupted—and just how long the consequences can last.
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