Elizabeth Tsurkov’s Release and the Growing Pressure on Iran’s Proxies

With demands escalating from Israel and Washington, Baghdad’s ruling coalition is scrambling to avert a regional catastrophe.

With the release of Israeli citizen Elizabeth Tsurkov—held for more than two and a half years by Iraq’s Iran-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)—key players within Baghdad’s ruling coalition quickly began searching for a deal to avert catastrophe. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pushes to complete his mission of eliminating Iran’s allies across seven fronts, the prospect of Iraq becoming the seventh and final front has forced militias and politicians to weigh what price they are willing to pay to avoid annihilation.

On September 10, 2025, Iraq’s Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s office announced Tsurkov’s release in what it described as essentially a rescue operation. But not everyone is buying that story, with sources coming forward to state that no formal military operation was carried out to free her. That same day, U.S. President Donald Trump stated, “I am pleased to report that Elizabeth Tsurkov, a Princeton Student, whose sister is an American Citizen, was just released by Kata’ib Hezbollah (MILITANT Hezbollah), and is now safely in the American Embassy in Iraq after being tortured for many months. I will always fight for JUSTICE, and never give up,”

The announcement came just 24 hours after an Israeli strike hit a Hamas leadership meeting in Doha, increasing the concerns within Baghdad that Israel can now cross any previously drawn red line. These fears weigh heavily on Iran’s allies in the ruling Coordination Framework (CF) coalition.

CF is an alliance of mostly Iran-backed Shiite political parties and militias in Iraq that formed after the 2021 elections. It plays a key role in Iraqi politics, often pushing for policies aligned with Iranian interests and advocating for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

On the day of her release, as Tsurkov was headed to Tel Aviv, a senior CF figure in direct contact with KH told me: “They are keen to know whether releasing her alive is enough for Trump and Netanyahu to avoid a catastrophe in Baghdad.”

Inside the Shiite militia camp, potential future scenarios are being cautiously discussed. They range from another wave of deadly “suicide pager” explosions like those that recently killed and wounded hundreds of Hezbollah members in Lebanon, to scenes reminiscent of Hamas’s destroyed safehouse in Doha. Both examples have inspired genuine fear among so-called “resistance” supporters in Baghdad.

Why are they convinced a reckoning is coming? Discussions with politicians close to the CF suggest that these groups believe they have already given Washington a series of free concessions. They pulled the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law from parliament despite Tehran’s insistence. This bill would have formalized a 200,000-strong force into an institution parallel and potentially superior to the Iraqi army. The militias also paused attacks on U.S. bases for extended periods. And they freed Tsurkov without extracting a significant trade, as one senior Iraqi official admitted, “not even in exchange for prisoners held by Israel.”

Many see these “gifts” as approved by Tehran, still reeling from its war with Israel and the U.S. But after the Doha strike, and Washington’s move to add four more Iraqi factions to the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, the question inside Baghdad is: What more do the Americans want?

Until August 2025, the FTO list included only two Iraqi Shiite groups: Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), led by Qais al-Khazali (designated in 2020), and Kataib Hezbollah (KH), led by Ahmad Mohsen Faraj al-Hamidawi (designated in 2009). Today, the number has grown to six.

The State Department recently added four more militias, raising the bar beyond the Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) list. These are: Harakat al-Nujaba (HN) led by Akram al-Kaabi, Kataib al-Imam Ali led by Shibl al-Zaydi, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya led by Haidar Muthar al-Saadi, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) led by Abu Ala al-Walai. All pledge allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the new designations were meant to “apply maximum pressure on Iran until they change course.”

But do these factions really care? Not much. Qais al-Khazali, for instance, despite his designation in 2022, has only expanded his political clout: he wields significant influence over Iraq’s Ministry of Higher Education, the governorship of Babil province, more than 10 parliamentary seats, and plans to grow stronger in the next elections.

Khazali’s economic and media power has also surged. Once a battlefield commander after 2003, he has become a businessman managing oil and construction deals, protected by a professional media machine. Today, he is evolving into a “deal maker” despite his bloody past. To many observers, the FTO list has come to resemble a treatment ward: a place where terrorists are quarantined, but can, if they accept the “vaccine,” be released back into political life.

Iraqi politicians inside Shiite parties say militias are searching for the “right formula.” They point to Ahmad al-Sharaa, placed on the FTO list in 2014, who was removed in June 2025—only to emerge as Syria’s new president. That raises questions among Iraqi factions: can they avoid the fate of Osama bin Laden, who was designated before being killed in 2011?

For the Shiite community loyal to Khamenei, theological dogma remains at the heart of political decision-making. Ideologically, losses against “imperialism” are reframed as victories in faith’s ledger. But in practice, that mantra no longer suffices. After the latest 12-day war with Israel, it became clear that even Iran itself cannot absorb more pressure, pushing its proxies to explore deals to ensure survival.

U.S. sanctions themselves don’t scare the militias. Tehran has lived under them for decades. What does terrify them is the possibility that sanctions are a prelude to Netanyahu’s decisive strike. Counting Gaza, the West Bank, Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, only Iraq remains as the seventh, and perhaps the last, front.

Thus, many in Baghdad see the militias’ concessions to Washington as “paying health insurance premiums.” The more they pay, the longer they can postpone the final blow. But the lingering question is whether Washington can truly stop Netanyahu from liquidating the seventh front altogether.

In the week following the designation of the four new groups, these militias escalated their security precautions. Reports suggest they have stepped up camouflage of their bases and forced their leaders into triple-layered security bubbles, avoiding phones and the internet inside highly fortified safehouses. It is a scene more reminiscent of Bin Laden’s final days than of Ahmad al-Sharaa’s triumphant visit to Washington this month. And a sign that Iraq’s militias are bracing for the possibility that the seventh front may be about to open.

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