Divided We Stand a Chance

The next phase of Syria’s reconstruction hinges on a governance architecture that empowers all stakeholders and abandons the persistent but failed pursuit of central dominance.

For more than a century, Syrian politics has been plagued by the illusion that unity requires uniformity and that centralization is the only way to hold the country together. In reality, every attempt to impose a strong center has deepened divisions, empowered authoritarianism, and fueled conflict. Today, as Syria emerges battered from more than a decade of war and five decades of totalitarianism, clinging to this illusion will only lead to further political atomization.

The push to reassert central authority in places like Suwayda—or to dismantle Kurdish self-rule in the northeast—ignores the fact that these demands for autonomy are not new. They reflect grievances as old as the modern Syrian state itself—grievances born of exclusion, broken promises, and decades of heavy-handed centralization.

A Century of Warnings

The modern states of the Levant were assembled in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse after World War I. For centuries, the region was a patchwork of provinces and semi-autonomous districts tied loosely to Istanbul. When the empire collapsed, France inherited a mandate over “Greater Syria” and proceeded to redraw it into separate political entities—creating Lebanon as a distinct state while dividing the rest into multiple Syrian statelets: the Alawite State along the coast, the Druze State in Jabal al-Druze, and a Sunni Arab core centered on Damascus and Aleppo. This was a classic divide-and-rule tactic, but it also mirrored the reality that Syria was, and remains, a mosaic of communities made up of the Alawites, Druze, Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Christians, and others.

When independence came in 1946, Arab nationalists in Damascus, backed by urban elites across the country, set to erase these divisions and forge a strong, centralized state with a cohesive national identity and modern economy. The vision was noble in theory but blind in practice. By suppressing diversity and dismantling local autonomy, they underestimated the depth of communal grievances and planted the seeds of future unrest.

• The Druze resisted early moves to curb their autonomy, beginning with President Shukri Al-Quwatli in 1946. When they opposed President Adib al-Shishakli in the early 1950s, his response was brutal. Suwayda was bombarded in 1954. The message was unmistakable—no tolerance for local self-rule. Yet the yearning for it never died.

• The Alawites, fearing Sunni dominance after centuries of marginalization—and seeing their autonomy dreams crushed with the trial and execution of Salman Murshid, one of its main champions—turned to the military. Exclusion drove them into the officer corps, and when the Ba‘ath seized power in 1963, Alawite officers rose with it. By 1970, Hafez al-Assad had consolidated an Alawite-led authoritarian regime that would rule for decades. The Sunni elite’s obsession with centralization backfired spectacularly: the state they built to secure dominance became the instrument of their reversal—and ultimately, of their marginalization.

• The Kurds, denied even cultural recognition for which they had been lobbying since independence, faced Arabization campaigns and mass denationalization in 1962, when 120,000 lost citizenship overnight. These injustices radicalized Kurdish politics, shaped their decision to remain largely neutral during the Syrian conflict, and paved the way for today’s experiment in self-administration.

When Adib Shishakli’s artillery rained on Suwayda, he hoped to crush dissent. Instead, he signed his own political death warrant—his regime collapsed within months. That pattern has repeated throughout Syrian history: force may silence local voices for a time, perhaps a long time, but it only deepens resentment, undermines the legitimacy of the state, and fuels future rebellions.

Centralization has long been the problem, not the panacea, for Syria. Judging by recent developments in Suwayda, the new rulers of Damascus seem to have inherited the blind spot of the old Arab nationalists, with the same disastrous consequences on the horizon.

Federalism Is Not Treason

Federalism and decentralization have historically been treated as red lines in Syrian politics, equated with partition and fragile statehood. But that is a false dichotomy. As its modern history has amply demonstrated, the real threat to Syria’s unity is not decentralization, but the refusal to accommodate diversity within a shared political framework.

In itself, decentralization is neither secession nor meant as a prelude to it. It is:

• A safeguard for communal and regional rights in a country where trust in central power in certain communities and regions is lacking.

• A mechanism for inclusive decision-making, especially on matters that shape local life.

• A shield against factional capture, ensuring that state institutions serve all citizens, not just the winners of a coup or the dominant sect or ethnic group.

The honest debate Syria needs today is not whether decentralization is acceptable. That question has already been answered by decades of oppression, bloodshed, and betrayal. The question is now: What form of decentralization can preserve Syria’s territorial integrity while ensuring justice for its communities?

This is the only way to prevent renewed war and foreign intervention. It is the only way to keep Syria whole without condemning it to another cycle of authoritarianism and revolt.

A Structural Solution

Decentralization, done right, can:

• Guarantee self-governance in Suwayda while protecting Bedouin and Christian minorities.

• Recognize Kurdish autonomy in parts of the northeast while safeguarding Arab and Assyrian communities.

• Transform zero-sum struggles for Damascus into a system of negotiated coexistence through electoral procedures, parliamentary resolutions, and judicial review.

Syria’s stability and long-term recovery depend on building political legitimacy from the ground up. Durable unity cannot be engineered through central edicts, but it can be negotiated through inclusive governance, equitable power-sharing arrangements, and institutional guarantees that protect diversity. A security framework based on broad participation is more sustainable than one that relies on coercive uniformity. To break the cycle of mistrust and instability, Syria’s leadership will need to replace the pursuit of centralized control with a model that distributes authority and fosters local ownership. This is not a call for partition, but for a governance architecture in which all communities have a meaningful stake in the state’s future.

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