Can Al-Sharaa Deliver on Peace?
Once the leader of Syria’s al-Qaeda affiliate, he must now prove he is the country’s best chance for stability.
I recently attended the Concordia Summit and participated in a panel discussion on the economic dimensions of peace in the Middle East. The day before—during the same event—Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, held a striking and historic public conversation with former CIA director General David Petraeus, a man who until recently had a $10 million bounty on his head. Notably, Petraeus led U.S. forces during the Iraq invasion, the same forces that captured and imprisoned Al-Sharaa from 2006 to 2011. Although the exchange offered no new revelations—most of his points had already surfaced in his 60 Minutes interview—it was still remarkable for what it symbolized: former enemies are capable of changing and of seeing eye-to-eye, to the extent that Petraeus even declared himself a fan of Al-Sharaa and wished him well in leading Syria.
The more I listen to Al-Sharaa and watch his public performance, the more convinced I am that he is—at least for this critical phase—the right person to lead Syria’s transition. He communicates with unusual poise, particularly when addressing Western audiences. He handles difficult questions with a blend of candor and necessarily cryptic restraint.
At this stage, not everything can be said aloud. He cannot, for example, admit that extremist elements in his own army remain only partially under his control; such an admission would only embolden them. Still, the facts on the ground suggest he is not in total command. Signs of rebelliousness abound, yet his quiet approach is, for now, containing the threat. Lifting international sanctions would give him more room to maneuver and, paradoxically, allow him to redirect some of those same extremist elements into reconstruction projects. Al-Sharaa’s ability to impress seasoned interlocutors is evident. Petraeus did not hide his admiration; neither did former President Donald Trump—men not easily impressed, and valuable allies for Syria to cultivate.
The contrast with Bashar al-Assad could not be starker. Assad the younger was always treated like a child trying to lecture adults, eager to appear clever yet never taken seriously. Al-Sharaa, by contrast, inherited no dynasty. He fought his way to the top and learned to be measured. His confidence is not arrogance, and he does not confuse the two. The more apt comparison is with Hafez al-Assad. Those who once acknowledged Hafez’s diplomatic tact and reliability should recognize similar qualities in Al-Sharaa. But he is also a creature of a different time: terse, direct, a man who has witnessed real battle and understands the cost of peace. As he told Petraeus, only a man of war can truly value peace. That may make him uniquely capable of striking an eventual peace with Israel—when the time is right. Trust-building must come first.
Equally promising is his economic vision. By betting on investment rather than loans, he has closed the door on debt-trap diplomacy. China, take note. Syria under Al-Sharaa signals openness to business with all its neighbors—minus Iran for now—provided its sovereignty is respected. This libertarian instinct could, and should, extend to Israel. The more Syria’s neighbors invest in its reconstruction, the less incentive they will have to destabilize it—and the less reason Syria will have to threaten them.
None of this erases my concerns. I compare Al-Sharaa to Hafez al-Assad—a comparison his supporters would hardly welcome—not to flatter or insult him but to underscore the weight of Syria’s history. He cannot escape his past or that of the movements and factions around him. (Once a U.S.-designated global terrorist as the founder of al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, Al-Sharaa’s rise from jihadist commander to Syria’s transitional president understandably poses a staggering challenge to his quest for international legitimacy.) That past complicates his outreach to minority communities, to Israel, and to certain international currents. At some point, he must acknowledge this. He must learn how to build bridges beyond Western audiences. He will need to say, clearly: I know our past conduct and ideological leanings have been a problem for many of you. But if you are willing to sit at the same table and admit your own shortcomings, we can work out an arrangement that serves us all.
Perhaps he cannot speak these words yet without alienating his base, but he should understand that silence leaves others guessing—and not everyone will guess charitably. On some issues, clarity is a necessity.
And there are questions only he can answer: Will he accept term limits, or is he planning to be another forever leader? Many have noted the appointment of his brothers and relatives to key posts. Given the Assad regime’s notorious family grip, does he not fear the parallels? And what of the growing perception—inside Syria and among expatriates—that people from Idlib and, to a lesser extent, Deir Ezzor enjoy preferential access to government contracts and jobs? Could such favoritism deepen Syria’s already dangerous divides?
Al-Sharaa dislikes being called a “pragmatist,” perhaps because some of the same circles that disdain the word “democracy” also sneer at pragmatism. Or perhaps what we label pragmatism is, for him, simply a matter of principle—and if so, that is encouraging.
Ultimately, one reason Al-Sharaa and the forces around him now lead Syria is their willingness to engage in self-review and course correction. By contrast, many of his critics have done no such soul-searching. Their concerns may be legitimate, but their refusal to evolve limits their credibility. Blaming the authority for everything is not serious politics; nihilistic alternatives are not solutions.
Self-review is not the prerogative of Al-Sharaa’s government alone. It is a challenge for all of us—inside Syria and across the diaspora. If we hope to rebuild a country worthy of the word “future,” we must match his willingness to reassess with our own.
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Remember Fidel Castro before taking al-Sharaa at his word:
Castro took power in Cuba in January, 1959. He emphatically denied that he was a Communist and made a point of always appearing in public wearing a religious medal. Meanwhile, he started by executing senior member of the previous regime, then sympathizers, then dissenters within his own movement.
Only in June of 1960, 18 months after taking power, Fidel Castro finally made a public statement that he was, and had always been a Marxist-Leninist.
Judging al-Sharaa by his words and gestures is as naive now as was judging Castro then. In Syria, the June, 1960 Cuba moment has not yet arrived.
The massacres of Alawites and Druze could not have happened without approval from al-Sharaa.
I think he has shown a lot of promise; however I also think Israel is intent on partitioning Syria and he may simply be too weak to stop it. As I explained below, the key will be whether he is sincere about establishing a government that educates and empowers his people or turns into just another tyrant.
https://open.substack.com/pub/mirrorsfortheprince/p/to-capitalize-on-the-promise-of-their?r=v623r&utm_medium=ios