In early November 2025, the United States took a dramatic and unprecedented turn in its policy toward Syria. For the first time since the country’s independence, a Syrian head of state, President Ahmed al-Sharaa, walked through the doors of the White House. His meeting with President Donald Trump, coupled with the administration’s support for a full repeal of sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act—passed in 2019 to impose sweeping economic penalties on Syria’s government and its foreign backers for wartime atrocities—signaled a new phase in U.S.–Syria relations.

It also reignited fierce debate in Washington, where lawmakers such as Representative Brian Mast remain staunchly opposed to lifting or easing sanctions, despite Mast’s late-night meeting with al-Sharaa and the notably positive impression that encounter appears to have left on him.

Their caution is understandable. But it is precisely this cautious stance that now threatens to undermine U.S. strategic interests, regional stability, and the long-term welfare of ordinary Syrians.

Supporters of keeping the Caesar Act intact argue that maintaining pressure or enabling rapid “snap-back” measures preserve U.S. leverage over a tenuous government and prevent backsliding. But this logic no longer aligns with conditions on the ground. If the goal is to influence Syria’s future, isolating its economy is the least effective strategy available.

Sanctions designed to punish governments often end up crippling the societies beneath them. Under the defunct Assad regime, Western policymakers essentially faced two options: mount a military intervention—something no government was willing to lead—or isolate a hostile regime through strict sanctions.

Those conditions have changed. The Assad regime has collapsed. A new, far more complex government, one actively seeking engagement with the international community, is now struggling to cultivate stability. This shift requires a fundamental reassessment of the logic behind continued U.S. sanctions.

The economic reality is straightforward. Strict political preconditions for sanctions relief will scare away nearly all serious investors. Those willing to engage will opt for short-term, low-risk ventures incapable of transforming the Syrian economy. Without sustained foreign investment, reconstruction is impossible; without reconstruction, economic recovery is unattainable. And when the economy remains frozen, the burden falls not on the government, but on millions of Syrians trying to rebuild their lives.

A starved economy also weakens the very actors within the transitional government—including President al-Sharaa—who are working to contain extremist groups and steer the country toward pragmatism. Across global case studies from Southeast Asia to North Africa, economic integration is among the most effective tools for reducing radicalization. Jobs, stability, and visible improvements in daily life choke off extremist narratives far more effectively than punitive isolation. Even hardened militants often turn toward worldly pursuits when conditions improve.

Conversely, when hope collapses, radicals become more interested in the raw pursuit of power. Syria is no exception. The tragic violence in the coastal mountains in March and the more recent unrest in Suweida Province show how quickly local tensions can escalate, eroding state authority and its ability to keep the peace—especially when extremist factions remain embedded within security structures. Continued sanctions would only deepen this vulnerability, undermining the government’s ability to contain radical actors and increasing the risk of renewed fragmentation and a descent back into civil war.

Sanctions would also accelerate Syria’s drift into the arms of Russia and China, despite the transitional government’s unprecedented desire to pivot toward the West. When Western doors close, Damascus has no choice but to look elsewhere for survival.

For the first time since 1946, Syria is signaling a willingness to align itself with the West. By joining the international alliance against the Islamic State and allowing the United States to open a base near Damascus, it has made its intentions unmistakably clear. Failure to completely lift the sanctions would prove a poor response and would squander a historic—and possibly fleeting—opportunity.

Skeptics point to the uncomfortable fact that Syria’s new leadership is composed of Islamists and former jihadist figures. Yet this demographic reality, ironically, grants these leaders political space that did not exist during the Assad era. The Sunni majority, after years of massacres and ethnic cleansing by Assad loyalists, Hezbollah, and Iran-backed militias, now views these former jihadist factions, ideology notwithstanding, as their protectors. They may not embrace the ideology, but they welcome the empowerment and safety these groups now provide for them.

This broad grassroots legitimacy gives the current leadership room to maneuver without feeling threatened by every criticism or concession. It has enabled pragmatic shifts, including the pursuit of U.S. engagement and alignment with Western security frameworks.

The transformation of former jihadists into rational policymakers is rare. It is also precisely the type of unlikely transition that history periodically forces the international community to shepherd rather than reject.

Lifting sanctions, reopening the U.S. embassy, encouraging American companies to participate in reconstruction, and maintaining constant diplomatic engagement—these are the tools that can meaningfully influence Syria’s future. These tools were impossible under Assad, who categorically rejected openness. They are possible now, and refusing them means abandoning the very leverage the United States has sought for decades.

This does not mean granting Damascus a blank check. Engagement must be tied to measurable reforms: rule of law, minority protections, anti-corruption measures, and the gradual containment of radical elements, including foreign militias. But these benchmarks should guide engagement rather than block it, and certainly should not take the form of snap-back triggers that would scare off investors and render sanctions relief largely symbolic.

Ultimately, the Trump Administration appears to understand the implications of this moment and has made the logical decision to lift all sanctions, backing the complete repeal of the Caesar Act. The Senate, by removing snap-back provisions from its bill, has also done its part. It is now time for the House to do the same—time for leaders like Representative Brian Mast, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to withdraw their objections and allow the bill to move forward. Weaning Syria off its long-standing “axis of resistance” posture has always enjoyed bipartisan appeal. Today, it is finally achievable. Repealing the Caesar Act is a critical step in bringing Syria into the Western fold—and keeping it there.

When the United Nations General Assembly meets in September, discussions will take place against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Gaza. But something new is unfolding: the diplomatic ground is shifting beneath Washington’s feet. France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other major Western powers are signaling their readiness to recognize a Palestinian state—some unilaterally, others under loose conditions. They are responding to the devastation in Gaza, growing international frustration with Israel’s policies, and a shared recognition that the current situation—prolonged occupation, chronic humanitarian crisis, and no political horizon—cannot be sustained.

For the United States, the coming months will require a clear policy choice. It can watch from the sidelines as allies move ahead, or it can seize the initiative and shape the terms of recognition to serve both regional stability and its own strategic interests. Washington’s role should not be to obstruct Palestinian statehood, but to structure it, anchoring recognition in a framework of genuine reform, complete Hamas disarmament, and clear regional incentives.

This approach would build on ideas first advanced in the early 2000s, when the Bush administration endorsed conditional statehood tied to measurable benchmarks. This strategy remains relevant and may offer the most credible path forward today.

In 2002, President George W. Bush became the first U.S. leader to openly back the creation of a Palestinian state “living side by side in peace and security with Israel.” His administration’s Roadmap for Peace, developed with the EU, Russia, and the UN, laid out an incremental approach: end violence, overhaul Palestinian governance, then negotiate final status. The effort collapsed amid Hamas’s rise and deepening Israeli security fears. But the core principle, phased recognition tied to performance, remains sound.

An updated version should be explicit and require:

• Provisional recognition of Palestinian statehood, contingent on verifiable benchmarks;

• Total disarmament and dissolution of Hamas and other armed factions, guaranteed by regional and international partners;

• Institutional reform within the Palestinian Authority, including anti-corruption safeguards, judicial independence, and leadership renewal;

• Mutual recognition, with Israel acknowledged as a Jewish and democratic state within secure borders;

• A phased normalization plan between Israel and Arab/Muslim-majority states linked to continued Palestinian progress.

This is the time to act. In July, Paris warned it would recognize a Palestinian state by September absent a viable U.S.-led peace push. London called recognition “a necessary step toward reviving a moribund peace process.” Ottawa pledged support within a “responsible, enforceable framework” safeguarding Israel’s security. Even Portugal has set recognition in motion, banking on Palestinian commitments and Arab willingness to normalize ties with Israel.

These moves share a common thread of frustration with Israel’s war conduct and the lack of a long-term plan. Yet none of these governments have paired recognition with clear, enforceable conditions on Hamas disarmament or Palestinian Authority reform. Washington is well-positioned to define a recognition process that moves beyond symbolism and functions as a practical instrument of policy.

The timing is unusually favorable. Israel has made Hamas’s disarmament a key war objective. At the same time, the Arab League, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, issued an unprecedented joint call in July for Hamas to disarm and relinquish control of Gaza. For the first time, virtually all Arab states condemned the October 7 attack. Even Iran and its proxies, weakened by regional dynamics, are poorly positioned to mount an effective counteroffensive.

The question is no longer whether Hamas will lose its grip, but what comes next and who will define it.

A U.S.-led provisional recognition framework could revive the stalled normalization process between Israel and the Arab world. The original Abraham Accords of 2020 brought Israel into formal relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, but left Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Pakistan on the sidelines. Gaza’s war and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hardline stance froze any momentum.

Now, with Hamas marginalized and a credible Palestinian partner in play, normalization could again be politically viable. Gulf and Asian officials have privately signaled interest in reopening talks, provided the Palestinian question is addressed. Washington could use conditional recognition to provide precisely that cover.

The dividends would be more than diplomatic. A reformed, internationally recognized Palestinian state could anchor a long-envisioned economic corridor linking the Mediterranean to the Gulf. The Saudi Public Investment Fund’s $700 billion war chest, the UAE’s global finance clout, and Israel’s $50 billion tech sector could converge in projects spanning logistics, agriculture, and technology transfer, creating powerful economic disincentives for renewed conflict.

Israeli business leaders have quietly explored such ventures. But they insist on a secure, transparent Palestinian governance structure before investing—a condition a U.S.-led recognition framework could help guarantee.

For Israel, its current trajectory is unsustainable. Gaza has deepened its diplomatic isolation, eroded its European alliances, and fueled grassroots hostility worldwide. A U.S.-led framework offers an off-ramp. By embracing a credible process for Palestinian statehood, Israel could undercut boycott campaigns, reenter key markets, and rehabilitate its declining international standing.

The reputational gains would be well worth it. Israeli universities could sidestep academic boycotts; tech firms could expand into previously closed markets; and Israel could credibly claim it seeks peace with reformed, responsible Palestinian leadership.

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) governance failures are still the elephant in the room. Corruption perceptions are widespread. Nearly 90 percent of Palestinians view the PA as corrupt, and most want President Mahmoud Abbas to resign. In April 2024, the PA announced reforms aimed at transparency and the rule of law. But history shows such pledges often fade absent external enforcement.

Donor states must insist on hard accountability:

• Independent oversight with rotating international leadership;

• Transparent budgets and public reporting;

• Merit-based appointments;

• Judicial independence;

• A functioning legislature meeting regularly.

Failure to demand such reforms after the Oslo Accords helped pave Hamas’s path to electoral victory in 2006. This time, accountability must be enforced.

Critics will say recognition rewards terror after October 7. But under a conditional model, recognition is not a gift to Hamas. It is contingent upon Hamas’s complete disarmament, political dismantlement, and release of the hostages, coupled with the rise of a legitimate, reform-minded Palestinian leadership.

This framework is unambiguously designed to demonstrate that armed resistance brings no lasting benefits, while effective governance and sustained diplomacy can produce measurable outcomes. Palestinians gain a viable political alternative to Hamas’s nihilism. Israel gains security guarantees and normalization prospects. And the United States gains strategic breathing room to focus on other priorities—from Ukraine to Taiwan to economic security.

Washington has the opportunity to guide the next phase of the Israeli–Palestinian process by advancing provisional recognition linked to demilitarization, institutional reform, and regional integration, and alleviating the prolonged humanitarian suffering in Gaza. Reducing civilian hardship is essential for building the legitimacy of any future Palestinian leadership and for creating conditions in which diplomacy can succeed.

To achieve this, the United States will need to set the pace and direction of the process, rather than reacting to the initiatives of others. The path forward will be written either with U.S. leadership or without it. The choice remains Washington’s to make.

For more than a century, Syrian politics has been plagued by the illusion that unity requires uniformity and that centralization is the only way to hold the country together. In reality, every attempt to impose a strong center has deepened divisions, empowered authoritarianism, and fueled conflict. Today, as Syria emerges battered from more than a decade of war and five decades of totalitarianism, clinging to this illusion will only lead to further political atomization.

The push to reassert central authority in places like Suwayda—or to dismantle Kurdish self-rule in the northeast—ignores the fact that these demands for autonomy are not new. They reflect grievances as old as the modern Syrian state itself—grievances born of exclusion, broken promises, and decades of heavy-handed centralization.

A Century of Warnings

The modern states of the Levant were assembled in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse after World War I. For centuries, the region was a patchwork of provinces and semi-autonomous districts tied loosely to Istanbul. When the empire collapsed, France inherited a mandate over “Greater Syria” and proceeded to redraw it into separate political entities—creating Lebanon as a distinct state while dividing the rest into multiple Syrian statelets: the Alawite State along the coast, the Druze State in Jabal al-Druze, and a Sunni Arab core centered on Damascus and Aleppo. This was a classic divide-and-rule tactic, but it also mirrored the reality that Syria was, and remains, a mosaic of communities made up of the Alawites, Druze, Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Christians, and others.

When independence came in 1946, Arab nationalists in Damascus, backed by urban elites across the country, set to erase these divisions and forge a strong, centralized state with a cohesive national identity and modern economy. The vision was noble in theory but blind in practice. By suppressing diversity and dismantling local autonomy, they underestimated the depth of communal grievances and planted the seeds of future unrest.

• The Druze resisted early moves to curb their autonomy, beginning with President Shukri Al-Quwatli in 1946. When they opposed President Adib al-Shishakli in the early 1950s, his response was brutal. Suwayda was bombarded in 1954. The message was unmistakable—no tolerance for local self-rule. Yet the yearning for it never died.

• The Alawites, fearing Sunni dominance after centuries of marginalization—and seeing their autonomy dreams crushed with the trial and execution of Salman Murshid, one of its main champions—turned to the military. Exclusion drove them into the officer corps, and when the Ba‘ath seized power in 1963, Alawite officers rose with it. By 1970, Hafez al-Assad had consolidated an Alawite-led authoritarian regime that would rule for decades. The Sunni elite’s obsession with centralization backfired spectacularly: the state they built to secure dominance became the instrument of their reversal—and ultimately, of their marginalization.

• The Kurds, denied even cultural recognition for which they had been lobbying since independence, faced Arabization campaigns and mass denationalization in 1962, when 120,000 lost citizenship overnight. These injustices radicalized Kurdish politics, shaped their decision to remain largely neutral during the Syrian conflict, and paved the way for today’s experiment in self-administration.

When Adib Shishakli’s artillery rained on Suwayda, he hoped to crush dissent. Instead, he signed his own political death warrant—his regime collapsed within months. That pattern has repeated throughout Syrian history: force may silence local voices for a time, perhaps a long time, but it only deepens resentment, undermines the legitimacy of the state, and fuels future rebellions.

Centralization has long been the problem, not the panacea, for Syria. Judging by recent developments in Suwayda, the new rulers of Damascus seem to have inherited the blind spot of the old Arab nationalists, with the same disastrous consequences on the horizon.

Federalism Is Not Treason

Federalism and decentralization have historically been treated as red lines in Syrian politics, equated with partition and fragile statehood. But that is a false dichotomy. As its modern history has amply demonstrated, the real threat to Syria’s unity is not decentralization, but the refusal to accommodate diversity within a shared political framework.

In itself, decentralization is neither secession nor meant as a prelude to it. It is:

• A safeguard for communal and regional rights in a country where trust in central power in certain communities and regions is lacking.

• A mechanism for inclusive decision-making, especially on matters that shape local life.

• A shield against factional capture, ensuring that state institutions serve all citizens, not just the winners of a coup or the dominant sect or ethnic group.

The honest debate Syria needs today is not whether decentralization is acceptable. That question has already been answered by decades of oppression, bloodshed, and betrayal. The question is now: What form of decentralization can preserve Syria’s territorial integrity while ensuring justice for its communities?

This is the only way to prevent renewed war and foreign intervention. It is the only way to keep Syria whole without condemning it to another cycle of authoritarianism and revolt.

A Structural Solution

Decentralization, done right, can:

• Guarantee self-governance in Suwayda while protecting Bedouin and Christian minorities.

• Recognize Kurdish autonomy in parts of the northeast while safeguarding Arab and Assyrian communities.

• Transform zero-sum struggles for Damascus into a system of negotiated coexistence through electoral procedures, parliamentary resolutions, and judicial review.

Syria’s stability and long-term recovery depend on building political legitimacy from the ground up. Durable unity cannot be engineered through central edicts, but it can be negotiated through inclusive governance, equitable power-sharing arrangements, and institutional guarantees that protect diversity. A security framework based on broad participation is more sustainable than one that relies on coercive uniformity. To break the cycle of mistrust and instability, Syria’s leadership will need to replace the pursuit of centralized control with a model that distributes authority and fosters local ownership. This is not a call for partition, but for a governance architecture in which all communities have a meaningful stake in the state’s future.

Fourteen years after the Syrian uprising, the country remains neither fully united under a new social contract nor completely disintegrated. Instead, it sits at a precarious crossroads, fragmented into zones of control dominated by three men: Mazloum Abdi in the northeast, Hikmat al-Hijri in Suwayda, and Ahmad al-Sharaa in Damascus. Each commands loyalty, resources, and armed forces. Each claims to represent stability and autonomy for their people. And each embodies a radically different vision for Syria’s future.

Can these men—an ideologue, a patriarch, and a chameleon—be part of a negotiated framework for peace? Or will fragmentation ossify into permanent division, fueling future wars, forced displacement, authoritarian relapse, and organized crime? Most importantly, what role can the U.S. and other stakeholders play to steer these dynamics toward a sustainable outcome rather than chaos?

The Ideologue: Mazloum Abdi

Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is often celebrated in Western capitals as a reliable partner in the fight against ISIS. Under his leadership, the northeast has remained one of Syria’s most stable regions. His model of governance, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, projects a strong ideological imprint drawn from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) founder Abdullah Öcalan’s philosophy of Democratic Confederalism. Democratic Confederalism envisions a decentralized system of local self-governance. It emphasizes direct democracy, political ecology, feminism, multiculturalism, self-defense, and elements of a cooperative economy.

Strengths:

• Institutional Structure: The region boasts functioning local councils, a civilian legislative body, and decentralized security apparatuses.

• Inclusivity (on paper): The administration enshrines gender parity and minority representation, winning support from most Kurds, local Christian communities, and some Arab tribes.

• Relative Stability: Compared to much of Syria, the northeast has maintained order and provided basic services.

• Military Capacity: The SDF commands well-trained, well-equipped, and battle-hardened forces with experience in counter-ISIS operations, making Abdi a critical security actor in any national framework.

Challenges:

• Arab Discontent: Many Arab communities in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Tabqa, and Hassakah accuse the SDF of marginalization and cultural imposition. Many are simply unhappy with SDF rule.

• Over-Centralization: Despite rhetoric of decentralism, real power remains concentrated in SDF leadership.

• Ideological Education: Curricula steeped in Öcalanist thought alienate conservative populations, especially among Arabs.

• Kurdish Divisions: Non-PKK-aligned Kurds feel excluded, fueling intra-Kurdish tensions.

• Broader Inclusivity Issues: Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, and Turkmen have voiced concerns over ideological bias and governance practices.

Potential Role

If grievances of Arabs and other ethnic groups are addressed and ideological rigidity eased, Commander Abdi and the SDF could anchor a federal or highly decentralized model for Syria—one with legal guarantees for minorities and gender equality that extend beyond the transitional period. Abdi could also serve as a key interlocutor for those advocating secular governance and broader social freedoms in a post-conflict Syria.

The Patriarch: Hikmat al-Hijri

Over the last few years, Hikmat al-Hijri has emerged as the spiritual leader of Syria’s Druze community, and in recent months as Suwayda’s paramount political figure. This rise was not accidental: for years before the fall of the Assad regime, al-Hijri worked diligently to erode the influence of other Druze elders, positioning himself as the community’s central authority.

Strengths:

• Legitimacy: Holds the loyalty of many Druze clans, particularly after resisting Damascus’s attempts to reassert control in Suwayda.

• Civil Rhetoric: Advocates for a technocratic government free of sectarian bias and calls for an end to corruption.

• External Support: Reportedly benefits from Israeli backing, which compensates for the relative weakness of Druze militias and reinforces his position as a regional player.

Challenges:

• Administrative Inexperience: Suwayda lacks the bureaucratic capacity to govern without significant external support.

• Reliance on Old Networks: Power flows through traditional elites rather than formal institutions.

• External Ties and Shadow Networks: Figures in his orbit are rumored to have links to the Captagon trade (the state-sponsored drug manufacturing and trafficking apparatus of Ba'athist Syria) and former Assad loyalists—a vulnerability that could undermine credibility.

• Failure to Accommodate the Bedouin Minority: No meaningful dialogue has taken place with neighboring Bedouin communities, leading to violent confrontations and the forced displacement of most Bedouins from Suwayda.

Potential Role

With security guarantees and international backing, al-Hijri could play an important role in stabilizing Syria, particularly in the south, and help improve relations with Israel, reducing the risk of further incursions and interference. His success, however, will hinge on his ability to crack down effectively on Captagon production and trade in his region, repair the fractures he helped create within the Druze community, and transition from charismatic leader to institutional builder, while ensuring external actors provide support without reinforcing clientelism.

The Chameleon: Ahmad al-Sharaa

If Abdi is the ideologue and al-Hijri the patriarch, Ahmad al-Sharaa is the consummate pragmatist—the “chameleon” who has reinvented himself repeatedly since his jihadist days. Now presiding over Damascus after Assad’s ouster, al-Sharaa seeks international legitimacy and presents himself as a transitional figure capable of stabilizing Syria.

Strengths:

• Control of the Capital: Holds sway over Damascus and core state institutions.

• Military Leverage: Commands significant armed forces and maintains alliances with major Sunni tribes.

• Broad Sunni Backing: Enjoys strong support among Arab Sunnis—especially youth, urban elites, and even some secular elements.

• Diplomatic Openings: Engaged global powers and secured partial sanctions relief, signaling a pragmatic turn toward statesmanship.

Challenges:

• Authoritarian Reflexes: Despite reformist rhetoric, decision-making remains highly centralized and opaque.

• Islamist Legacy: His refusal to accept federalism—combined with only vague commitments to democracy and individual rights—raises doubts about the durability of pluralism and tolerance for secular lifestyles.

• Minority Integration: Relations with Alawites and Christians remain tense, fueling fears of Sunni dominance and possible institutionalized sectarianism.

• Radical Elements: His inability or unwillingness to fully neutralize jihadist factions threatens both domestic and international legitimacy.

Potential Role:

Al-Sharaa’s buy-in is essential for any settlement. With his base in the capital and control of state infrastructure, he is the linchpin for reconstruction and normalization. But his evolution from insurgent commander to national statesman is far from complete; his Islamist and sectarian Sunni tendencies are still quite pronounced, coloring the entire transitional government (TG). The TG itself is ruling as though it has electoral legitimacy, and the line between it and HTS leadership is pretty thin. Civil society activists and external leverage will be decisive in helping compensate for these deficiencies.

Shared Patterns: Old Habits, New Faces

Despite their different backgrounds and governing models, the three leaders share strikingly similar habits shaped by Syria’s authoritarian legacy and the pressures of wartime survival. These patterns, if left unchecked, risk replicating the very dynamics that fueled Syria’s descent into conflict.

• Inclusion in Rhetoric, Exclusion in Practice: All promise representation but struggle to integrate minorities under their authority.

• Security First: Stability and control take precedence over democratization.

• Dangerous Alliances: Tactical accommodation of radicals undermines long-term governance.

• Political Machinations: Each leader has a record of sidelining rivals, revealing enduring authoritarian instincts.

The Stakes

Failure to forge consensus risks hardening Syria’s de facto partitions into permanent fragmentation—a scenario ripe for forced displacement, authoritarian relapse, organized crime, and exploitation by external powers. Captagon trafficking, human smuggling, and militia politics could define the next decade.

Conversely, success—even if improbable—could yield a federal or decentralized Syria capable of gradual democratization and reconstruction. That outcome requires more than rhetoric. It requires a structured, enforceable agreement among the three leaders and their respective camps, grounded in constitutional principles and supported by international guarantees.

This phase of Syria’s transition must focus on stabilization through the establishment of structural frameworks that will lay the foundation for inclusive governance and economic recovery. Only then can debates over representation, transparency, and participation become meaningful.

The focus on these three figures reflects their current dominance: each commands a loyal base, substantial resources, and enjoys international or regional backing. Representatives of other communities should certainly be consulted and included in broader processes, but the triumvirate remains the core around which any workable power-sharing framework must be built.

That said, the equation could shift. If Syria’s tribes—especially those in the central and eastern regions—unite behind a single representative leader, that figure will need to join negotiations on an equal footing with the trio. At that point, Syria’s future might rest not in a triumvirate, but in a quartet.

The United States, France, and regional powers should concentrate on helping this triumvirate bridge divides and agree on decentralization and power-sharing—a formula that enables each to claim a political victory before their constituencies.

Policy Recommendations

Breaking the current deadlock requires a combination of pragmatic compromises and strong external incentives. The following measures can help steer these power centers toward an inclusive and enforceable settlement.

1. Facilitated Power-Sharing Dialogue
   Establish an internationally mediated platform (with U.S. backing) to negotiate constitutional principles, security arrangements, and revenue-sharing mechanisms.

2. Adopt a Bill of Rights Now
   Guarantee individual and minority rights through a constitutional charter enforced by an independent judiciary—implemented immediately, not deferred until a final constitution.

3. Security Sector Reform
   Create a Federal Defense Council integrating SDF units, Druze militias, and central forces under proportional representation, with clear limits on central intervention.

4. Incentivize Good Governance
   Lift sanctions immediately to ease economic pressure and accelerate stabilization. At the same time, use informal channels—such as phased disbursement of aid and diplomatic leverage—to encourage inclusive governance. Prioritize joint projects between autonomous regions and the central government, financed through a dedicated international pool.

5. Prevent Radical Drift
   Condition support on dismantling extremist factions and prohibiting cross-border trafficking.

6. Institutionalize Autonomy
   Legally enshrine decentralized governance for Kurds and Druze within a federal framework to reduce secessionist pressures without eroding sovereignty.

Syria’s fate rests in the hands of three men—an ideologue, a patriarch, and a chameleon. None is a democrat. Yet, in their convergence lies the possibility of either a fragile peace or a permanent war economy. The international community cannot afford to stand aside. It must act now, not to choose winners, but to build guardrails that transform rival fiefdoms into a functioning state.